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Carbon removal strategies and negative emissions technologies have in later years been 
emphasised as mechanisms that can help human-kind halt rising temperatures and fight climate 
change. However, such mechanism has been shown to have negative impacts on local 
communities. As a result, scholars of political ecology argue that carbon removal projects and 
offset mechanisms needs to be critically studied in order to develop further understanding of 
the feasibility concerns and socio-political consequences. This thesis aims to contribute to this 
conversation through a critical study of Kenya’s REDD readiness process. Reducing Emissions 
from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD) is one of the existing carbon offset 
mechanisms, and I argue that important lessons can be learned from critically assessing this 
this negative emission mechanism. This thesis uses the case of the REDD readiness process in 
Kenya in combination with the Mau Forest complex conservation project to illuminate how 
carbon removal strategies can facilitate to a process of accumulation in contrast to benefit 
sharing. This theoretical framework of accumulation by dispossession is a useful perspective 
when aiming to understand how policies of conservation, afforestation and reforestation can 
ultimately lead to appropriation of landscapes to the benefit of powerful actors like private 
companies and state agencies. To be able to answer the research question, a qualitative content 
analysis of relevant policy documents was applied. The findings show that the policy 
framework does not directly facilitate accumulation by dispossession. Nevertheless, in the 
Kenyan context, and without a strong framework for including and protecting communities 
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Climate change has in the last decades been a huge part of international politics. From the 
Montreal protocol (1987) and creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 
1988, to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto 
Protocol (1997) and the Paris Agreement (2015), climate change has been a source of 
discussions, disagreements, progress, and concerns. Today, future generations are worried 
about the earth they will one day inherit, evident in last years “Skolstrejk för klimatet” (school 
strike for the climate) initiated by Greta Thunberg.  
 
In 2012, the United Nations (UN) gave birth to the Sustainable Development Goals which were 
to “…meet the urgent environmental, political and economic challenges facing our world.” 
(UNDP, 2020, para. 1). As of 2019, 197 nations have signed the Paris Agreement, pledging 
themselves to slow down climate change by limiting the rising temperature to 2°C above pre-
industrial levels (Heck et al., 2018; UNFCCC, 2020). However, the question remains, how can 
the nations of the world limit and slow down the rising temperatures? And how are these 
climate mitigating strategies and policies framed to effectively mitigate climate change? 
 
In a special report, the IPCC ( 2018) presents “four illustrative pathways” to limit the 
temperature growth to 1.5°C above pre industrial temperatures by 2100. These pathways 
include different strategies to reduce the global net CO2 emissions. Some of the strategies are 
based on the reduction of emissions through lower energy demands, increase in use of 
renewable energy, and/or reduction of energy demands from coal, oil and gas to mention a few. 
In other pathways, the report emphasises the use of negative emissions technologies (NETs), 
especially in scenarios where energy and resource demands are high. These NETs are designed 
to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere and contribute to offset emissions from fossil 
fuels and industry. The carbon dioxide removal strategies used in the reports assessment 
models, Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) and Agriculture, Forestry and 
Other Land Use (AFOLU), are both negative emission mechanisms that require varying 
degrees of land alterations.   
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However, the action to alter landscapes has been shown to be complex and contested processes 
often infused by conflicts (Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2014; Fairhead & Leach, 1996; Leach 
& Scoones, 2015; Robbins, 2020). In the field of Political Ecology (PE), a variation of studies 
has shown that the basic assumptions of land and forest degradation are misguided and in some 
cases, utterly false (Fairhead & Leach, 1996). Further, forest conservation, or conservation of 
carbon sinks, as forests are conceptualized in climate change narratives, have been shown to 
remove the control over resources away from local groups and communities resulting in 
disruption of “…local systems of livelihood, production, and socio-political organization…” 
(Robbins, 2020, p. 18-19). 
 
 One of the theoretical approaches that have been applied to understand such processes is 
accumulation by dispossession. This concept, coined and developed by Harvey (2003), have 
been used in Political Ecology studies to show how conservation policies have led to 
appropriation of land to the benefit of powerful actors at the expense of local communities (e.g. 
Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012).  
 
There are many lessons to be learned when engaging with literature of political ecology. Some 
examples are the misreading of forest degradation in the African landscape (Fairhead & Leach, 
1996), alternative explanations to neo-Malthusian reasoning around soil erosion (Blaikie, 
1985), or misleading narratives about environmental degradation in Africa (Leach & Mearns, 
1996). Narratives about land degradation has increasingly been linked to climate change, CO2 
emissions and carbon dioxide removal. Following this, scholars of political ecology have in 
later years focused on this new reality. Leach and Scoones (2015) have dedicated a book to the 
theme. They write: 
 “… African deforestation narratives are now being invoked and indeed 
strengthened in a new global political and policy context. And they have 
acquired a new sense of urgency and drama, now interrelated with a global 
climate crisis and the struggle to tackle it” (p. 17) 
This conversation on carbon removal, negative emissions technology, and carbon sinks is fast 
growing (Carton et al., 2020; Minx et al., 2017). However, according to Carton et al. (2020, p. 
2), the assessment models dealing with climate projections are not engaging with lessons that 
can be learned from already existing negative emissions projects. According to Minx et al. 
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(2017) this is problematic. First of all, as the IPCC ( 2018) pathways illustrate, if the world 
does not rapidly decrease emissions the reliance on NETs as climate solutions will increase. In 
this scenario, where the world depends on NETs to keep the temperature down, it is important 
that projects which aims to remove carbon actually succeed. Minx et al. (2017) argues: 
“… understanding how to overcome political inertia internationally, 
regionally and nationally is of utmost importance. This is equally true for 
climate policies in general and those that target NETs development and 
deployment. In this sense, the modest engagement of social sciences and 
humanities in NETs research might be seen as a great worry by those who 
believe that more rapid progress on NETs is needed. If we do not fully 
comprehend the ethics and social dynamics around NETs, there might be 
little hope to succeed in deploying such technologies at required scales.” (p. 
8) 
This point is also made by Carton et al. (2020). In their article, they problematize the emphasis 
of negative emission and carbon removal in climate politics and belonging integrated 
assessment modelling by critically evaluating negative emission research. They argue that the 
promises of negative emissions technology, carbon dioxide removal, and carbon capture and 
storage have neglected lessons from the past. Additionally, they call for an inclusion of 
perspectives from critical social science in research, policy, and models regarding negative 
emissions. This would enable more responsible climate mitigation policies and research as well 
as better assessments of the feasibility of carbon removal projects such as REDD+. Concluding 
that “… the experiences with carbon forestry schemes such as REDD+ point to important 
lessons for negative emissions research and policy” (Carton et al., 2020, p. 12). 
 
UN-programme for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) is 
one of the existing carbon removal mechanisms. Looking at REDD or REDD+ policies and 
frameworks can, as Carton et al. (2020) states, can provide important lessons for future carbon 
removal projects. Considering this in the wider context of IPCC’s ( 2018) projections for 
climate mitigation, underlines the importance of understanding these lessons. Furthermore, 
REDD+ is presented by UN-REDD Programme (2019b) as “… the Fastest, Cheapest Climate 
Solution”. A mechanism that can save the environment and help humanity to slow down and 
possibly revers global warming while providing socio-economic benefits for local 
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communities. This indicates that REDD+ has come to stay as one of the major carbon removal 
strategies.  
 
Even if REDD+ is framed as one of the climate solutions, multiple studies has shown issues 
with this carbon removal strategy. Scholars have pointed out numerous problems and 
challenges with using forest conservation, reforestation, and afforestation as carbon removal 
strategies (e.g. Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012; Beymer-Farris & Bassett, 2012; Bumpus & 
Liverman, 2011; Cavanagh & Benjaminsen, 2014; Chomba et al., 2016; Kelly, 2011; Loft et 
al., 2017; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2017). Chomba et al. (2016) as an example, problematizes 
the distribution of benefits in Kenya’s REDD+ project. Their findings show that the REDD+ 
policy reinforces past injustices instead of tackling poverty and empowering local 
communities.  
 
The quick look into political ecology studies on REDD+ give the impression that reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation is a mechanism that does not serve benefits 
to local communities, but rather someone else. It does also indicate, in line with observations 
done by Carton et al. (2020) and Minx et al. (2017), that lessons from political ecology has not 
been included in REDD+ policy making.  
 
This study is firmly set within this gap identified by Carton et al. (2020); Minx et al. (2017). 
Through a critical study of Kenya’s REDD readiness process, on a national and regional level, 
this thesis aims contribute to the conversation on carbon removal strategies.  
 
1.1    Objective of the thesis  
To be able to contribute to this conversation, the objective of this thesis is to take a deep dive 
into the Kenyan REDD readiness process both on the national and sub national level. The case 
is divided into these two levels, one looking at REDD/REDD+ and the belonging framework 
which informs the readiness process. The other, present and scrutinizes the Mau Forest 
Complex  
 
The Mau forest complex, located in the Rift Valley in Kenya, is the largest closed canopy 
ecosystem in Kenya and serves a crucial ecological and economic role both inside and outside 
of the East African country. The restoration and conservation of this forest presented in the 
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REDD documents as an important contributor to overall REDD programme in Kenya (KFS, 
2010b). Further, the forest is a water catchment area with ecological and economic importance 
in Kenya (KFS, 2010b). The case of the conservation of the Mau Forest Complex serves the 
objective of this thesis. The case was chosen because of the area’s particular history of land 
allocation. In addition, conservation project has is in the implementation phase and have been 
exposed in media for evictions and human rights abuses.  
 
The objective of this study is to use the case of Kenya’s REDD+ policy process and the Mau 
Forest Complex conservation efforts to further inform how neoliberal conservation efforts and 
negative emissions technologies like afforestation and reforestation can facilitate a process of 
accumulation by dispossession. The REDD+ policy is a national framework that is being 
implemented on sub national levels. To enable further understanding of the operationalization 
of the REDD+ policy on the sub national level, the Mau Forest Complex conservation policy 
and efforts is analysed. 
 
1.2 Research questions 
To enlighten the problem area and meet the aims and objectives of this thesis the following 
research questions is answered: 
 
RQ1: How does the REDD+ policy process in Kenya facilitate accumulation by 
dispossession as opposed to fair benefit-sharing? 
 
There are three sub-questions that will aid the process of answering this main question.  
 
RQ 1.1: How does the REDD+ policy and the Mau Forest Complex 
conservation policy change landscape governing structures?  
 
RQ 1.2 How are different actors included in forest governance according to the 
policy documents? 
 
RQ 1.3 How does these structural changes restrict certain actors while 
empowering others?  
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2. Changing Landscapes to Reverse Climate Change: A 
Political Ecology Framework 
In this literature review I present and discuss literature related to relevant concepts. The chapter 
is structured into subchapters concerning relevant concepts. These subchapters will first 
address general information about the concepts before going into the academic discussion 
surrounding the concepts.  
 
I start of by going into climate change mitigation and negative emission technologies. This will 
include general information on the UNFCCC, the Paris Agreement, the Kyoto Protocol, and 
IPCC’s special report concerning Global Warming of 1.5 ºC. This will serve as a relevant 
backdrop for understanding what drives the implementation of carbon dioxide removal 
strategies. I will also present the academic discussion on negative emissions technologies, 
specifically focusing afforestation and reforestation.  
 
After this I will transit into a discussion on changing landscapes, bringing in discussions on 
environmental degradation and forest conservation. Moving on, I will present the history of 
REDD, the REDD+ architecture and REDD+ and how it became an important carbon removal 
strategy. In this section I will present the academic discussions on REDD and REDD+ as well 
as the general narratives linked to REDD/+. This will contribute to an understanding of the 
framework from which the Kenyan REDD readiness program was born.  
 
The last section briefly discusses the concept of sustainability. This is relevant because of the 
close link between REDD+ policies and the principles of sustainability. REDD+ is not just a 
mechanism that aims to establish a framework where countries and local communities get paid 
for their climate mitigation through forest conservation, afforestation, and reforestation. It is a 
mechanism that “… goes beyond simply deforestation and forest degradation and includes the 
role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks.” (UN-REDD Programme, 2019c, para. 2). 
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2.1 Climate Change Mitigation and Negative Emission 
Technologies  
The parties that have signed the Paris Agreement (PA) have agreed to limit the temperature 
rise to 2°C, with the aim to keep it under 1.5°C. This shall be done “… as soon as possible” 
(UNFCCC, 2015, p.22). More specifically the agreement reads: 
 
Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as 
possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country 
Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with 
best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the 
second half of this century, on the basis of equity, and in the context of 
sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty. (UNFCCC, 2015, 
p. 22) 
The question then becomes how to reach this global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions, and 
how to do it as soon as possible. 
 
To answer this question, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change was created in 1988 
to deal with the science of climate change (IPCC, 2020a). The Panel has since published five 
main assessment reports and several special reports. One of these, the special report “Global 
Warming of 1.5 °C”, was published in 2018 and addresses “… global greenhouse gas emission 
pathways, in the context of strengthening the global response to the threat of climate change, 
sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty.” (IPCC, 2020b) 
 
In this report, the IPCC ( 2018) have estimated that the anthropogenic emissions that are 
already released into the atmosphere will with high probability cause a temperature rise around 
0.5°C in the decades to come. Because anthropogenic emissions that are cumulated in the 
atmosphere have a warming after effect, time is a huge factor when working towards net zero 
global anthropogenic CO2 emission (IPCC, 2018, p. 5).  
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Consequently, the longer it takes to reduce emissions from fossil fuel and industry, the larger 
the scale of carbon dioxide removal strategies and negative emissions technologies have to be 
implemented (IPCC, 2018). The fourth pathway can be used to illustrate this. This is “A 
resource- and energy-intensive scenario in which economic growth and globalization lead to 
widespread adoption of greenhouse-gas-intensive lifestyles, including high demand for 
transportation fuels and livestock products- emissions reductions.” (IPCC, 2018, p. 14). To be 
able to reduce emissions in this projected future, the IPCC ( 2018) calculates that 7.2 million 
km2  of land would need to be converted into bioenergy crops. Compared to the first pathway, 
in which the world reduces its energy demands much quicker, where only 0.2 km2 of land 
would be required. The four scenarios laid out by the IPCC (2018) aim to stabilize the 
temperature at 1.5°C above the pre-industrial temperature by 2100.  
 
But what are Negative Emissions Technologies and how do they remove carbon dioxide? In a 
review of research on negative emissions Minx et al. (2017) have included a list on negative 
emissions technologies (see p. 2). The first, “afforestation and reforestation”, which is the NET 
of focus in this thesis, aim to remove carbon by planting trees which will capture and store CO2 
in the forest biomass. The second, Biochar and soil carbon sequestration (SCS), is a method 
where biomass is made into biochar through a pyrolysis process. The biochar is then mixed in 
with soil consequently storing the carbon from the biomass (Minx et al., 2017). The list goes 
on to include ocean fertilization, enhanced weathering, direct air capture (DAC), and 
Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). The BECCS  technology is according to 
Minx et al. (2017) a method where “Plants turn CO2 into biomass, which is then combusted in 
power plants, a process that is ideally CO2 neutral. If CCS is applied in addition, CO2 is 
removed from the atmosphere.” (p. 2).  
 
In this study, one of the NET’s listed above is of highest relevance. Afforestation and 
reforestation. This is because the technology necessitates changing landscapes, either by 
planting trees where there were none before, by planting trees where forests used to exist. 
Afforestation, reforestation and avoided deforestation is also the strategy applied by the 
REDD+ program to reduce emissions. Hence, this relates to Kenya’s REDD readiness process, 
as the programme aims to change landscapes much in the same way with the same goal.  
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Carbon dioxide emission reductions have received much attention since the nations of the 
world agreed to work together “… in order to avoid the risks of dangerous anthropogenic 
climate change” at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (Bumpus & Liverman, 2011, p. 203). Carbon 
removal entered the agenda early on in climate change debates (Lövbrand, 2009). It was 
defined in The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change as “any process, 
activity or mechanism which removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a 
greenhouse gas from the atmosphere” (UN, 1992, Article 1.8; as cited in Lövbrand, 2009, p. 
404). The concept was further discussed, and consequently included the Kyoto Protocol in 
1997 with the creation of carbon offset markets  and the Clean Development Mechanism 
(Bumpus & Liverman, 2011; Leach & Scoones, 2015). Since then, there has been a growing 
body of literature regarding carbon sinks, carbon dioxide removal, negative emissions 
technologies and so forth (Carton et al., 2020; Minx et al., 2017). Consequently, making the 
emphasis on different carbon removal strategies, in climate reports, models, and research, a 
topic worthy of scrutiny.  
 
Several scholars have asked why carbon removal have become a great part of climate policies. 
In the case of carbon sinks and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), FERN published 
a report recommending that they should not be included in the Kyoto Protocol (Kill, 2001). 
The report criticizes the use of carbon sinks, stating that the concept is not based on sufficient 
scientific evidence, but rather a collection of assumptions. According to Kill (2001), forest 
carbon sinks does not provide stable storage for carbon dioxide. There are huge risks of leakage 
as well as threatening the rights of forest dwelling people. The concern is that the CDM will 
allow for a business-as-usual mindset where industrialised countries can offset their own 
emissions in other countries rather than reducing their own emissions from oil, gas and industry 
(Carton et al., 2020; Kill, 2001; Lövbrand, 2009). Kill (2001) projects that carbon credits and 
the inclusion of carbon sinks in the Kyoto Protocol will lead to “CO2lonialism”:  
“Land in the South would be locked up in long-term land leases to provide 
carbon credits so the North can continue to pollute. The consequences for 
continued overconsumption and pollution by the North are born first and 




According to Carton et al. (2020) the past literature regarding negative emissions has neglected  
critical perspectives and past experiences of carbon sequestration through afforestation and 
reforestation. They argue that while the literature has engaged with different negative emission 
strategies through integrated assessment models, there is a tendency to overlook critical studies 
concerning the social, political and economic aspects of such strategies. This is concerning 
when seen in the light of the IPPC’s special report and the projections they have made for the 
necessity of implementing large scale carbon removal strategies such as BECCS and AFOUL. 
 
Minx et al. (2017) have performed another study on Negative Emissions Technology. This 
review provides an overview of the literature with an aim to offer an opportunity for “… 
effective scientific assessments of NETs” and an “… understanding of the thematic structure 
of the NET discussion” (p. 1, 7).  Their findings show that NET research is the fastest growing 
literature bulk in climate change research. However, it only composes around one percent of 
all climate change research. According to the authors, this is arguably too narrow when seen 
in light of the emphasis NETs have in projected futures where the world meets international 
climate change goals. In line with Carton et al. (2020), Minx et al. (2017) call for more NET 
research, especially from social sciences and humanities. They write: 
“If we do not fully comprehend the ethics and social dynamics around NETs, 
there might be little hope to succeed in deploying such technologies at 
required scales.”(Minx et al., 2017, p. 8) 
Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) is a negative emissions technology that 
is highly emphasised in IPCC (2020b) third and fourth pathways (see p. 14). As mentioned 
earlier, BECCS is a technology where plants, which absorb CO2 while growing, are made into 
biomass and then burned. The CO2 realised in this process is then captured and stored. (Minx 
et al., 2017, p. 2). BECCS is not directly related to the core aim of this thesis, however it is 
important to keep in mind that this NET requires active work towards land change. This is 
much in the same manner as land use change needed for conservation, afforestation and 
reforestation. 
 
While BECCS is a specific and technical negative emissions technology, AFOLU is a sector 
that includes emissions, possible emission reductions, and carbon dioxide removal related to 
different types of land use (Smith et al., 2014). Just under one quarter of the total anthropogenic 
greenhouse gasses (GHG) emissions comes from the AFOLU sector in form of forest 
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degradation, burning of biomasses, agriculture practices and more. Because of the scope and 
focus of this thesis, this chapter will focus on land use and land use change connected to forests; 
conservation, afforestation, and reforestation. More specifically it will focus on REDD+ 
mechanisms.  
 
2.1.1 The fastest, cheapest climate change solution: REDD+ 
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) was proposed as a 
climate mitigating mechanism by Costa Rica and Papa New Guinea at the Climate Change 
Convention in Montreal 2005 (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2020). The mechanism, became 
a central theme two years later, at the convention in Bali, and was seen as an opportunity for 
developing countries to contribute to climate mitigation efforts by conserving existing forests 
as well as combating deforestation and forest degradation through afforestation and 
reforestation (Klima- og miljødepartementet, 2020). As a result, the UN-REDD Programme 
and the The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) came to life in 2008. Although REDD 
received formal recognition in Bali 2007, the framework to establish REDD+ had a long time 
coming.  
 
The UN-REDD programme is made up and supported by three UN agencies: the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), and the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) (UN-REDD 
Programme, 2019d). The programme defines REDD or REDD+ on their website: 
 
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) is a 
mechanism developed by Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). It creates a financial value for the 
carbon stored in forests by offering incentives for developing countries to 
reduce emissions from forested lands and invest in low-carbon paths to 
sustainable development. Developing countries would receive results-based 
payments for results-based actions. REDD+ goes beyond simply 
deforestation and forest degradation and includes the role of conservation, 
sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks (UN-REDD Programme, 2019a). 
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While REDD or REDD+ is the mechanism under which countries would receive payments for 
environmental services (PES), the UN-REDD programme is designed to  assist countries in 
their efforts to achieve REDD readiness (Agrawal et al., 2011; UN-REDD Programme, 2019a). 
As the quote states, the difference between REDD and REDD+ is that whereas REDD stands 
for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, REDD+ encompasses a 
range of additional goals described in the above quote. Hence, REDD will in this thesis be used 
as an abbreviation while REDD+ will be used to refer to the UNFCCC mechanism that includes 
initiatives and policies linked to efforts taken by stakeholders in the process of achieving 
REDD readiness.  
 
At the COP14 in 2008, REDD was extended to include additional goals and the plus was added. 
Now REDD+ was to “include the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.” (CIFOR, 2020, para. 3). Funds 
to support REDD+ activities would help achieve goals like poverty reduction, enhance 
biodiversity and support ecosystem services (CIFOR, 2020). The framework was furthered in 
COP15 and COP16, but it did not finalize the details. Loft et al. (2017) writes: 
“International negotiations for reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks (REDD+) 
under the … UNFCCC were finally concluded in 2015. However, due to the 
complex design and implementation processes of REDD+ policies and 
measures, including benefit sharing at national and subnational levels, 
several challenges exist for sustainably reducing emissions while 
simultaneously managing the provision of social and environmental side-
objectives.” (p. 44) 
While the REDD+ framework was outlined in COP19 in Warsaw it was further included in the 
Paris Agreement under article 5 and belonging Decisions 16/CP.21 and 17/CP.17. The article 
in the COP21 agreement reads: 
“Parties are encouraged to take action to implement and support, including 
through results-based payments, the existing framework as set out in 
related guidance and decisions already agreed under the Convention for: 
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policy approaches and positive incentives for activities relating to reducing 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, and the role of 
conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of 
forest carbon stocks in developing countries; and alternative policy 
approaches, such as joint mitigation and adaptation approaches for the 
integral and sustainable management of forests, while reaffirming the 
importance of incentivizing, as appropriate, non-carbon benefits associated 
with such approaches” (UNFCCC, 2015, Article 5., Para. 2.) 
Reading from this, it is clear that alongside activities aimed at reducing emissions from forests, 
sustainability and additional benefits are integral to REDD+ activities and projects. This is 
reaffirmed in other related frameworks developed at different Conference of the Parties (COP) 
meetings (UNFCCC, 2016). This includes activities that should recognize “the needs of local 
and indigenous communities”, “the need for full and effective engagement of indigenous 
peoples and local communities” and “sustainable development and reducing poverty” 
(UNFCCC, 2016, p. 2, 6, 11).  
 
It is clear from this that REDD+ is meant to be more than an offset mechanism. It is framed as 
an instrument to reduce emissions while also fighting poverty, inequality, and unsustainable 
uses of land. However, as Loft et al. (2017) observed in their article, this complex framework 
is in danger of facing multiple challenges both in policy formation and implementation. Before 
going into this, there is need for a short overview of the REDD+ process including policy 
design, REDD readiness, and implementation. In other words: the architecture of REDD+. 
 
2.1.2 REDD+ architecture 
In 2009, CIFOR published a book trying to meet some of the challenges in the process of 
realising REDD+. In the introduction Angelsen et al. (2009), summarize some of these; 
“The ownership of forests is often unclear or contested. Governance is weak, 
and corruption and power struggles at many levels are rive. Most countries 
do not have good data, or the skills and systems to measure changes in 
forest carbon. Added to all this, the international REDD+ architecture itself 
is far from clear and will continue to evolve over the next few years.” (p. 1) 
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Despite the fact that the international REDD+ architecture has evolved since 2009, it still does 
represent a challenge because of its complexity (Loft et al., 2017). According to Wertz-
Kanounnikoff and Angelsen (2009) the global architecture of REDD+ will be transferred to 
national and subnational policies. This is because global policy formulations born from 
international climate negotiations that have set the stage for projects that will be implemented 
and realised on national and subnational levels. The global REDD+ architecture, where states 
has to report to institutions, can be divided into three phases (Wertz-Kanounnikoff & Angelsen, 
2009). This is also reflected in an UN-REDD Programme presentation about REDD+ readiness 
(UN-REDD Programme, 2013). 
 
The two first phases are a part of the readiness process. The readiness process has to be 
completed before countries can receive a Readiness Package and revenues from REDD+ efforts, 
which is the third phase. The first phase includes preparation of strategies, capacity building in 
monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV), multi-stakeholder consultation, and start up 
demonstration activities (UN-REDD Programme, 2013; Wertz-Kanounnikoff & Angelsen, 
2009). And the second phase include employment of policies and measures (PAMS), this is 
what Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Angelsen (2009) calls the ‘more advanced readiness’ phase. In 
this second phase, demonstration activities is a part of the showing how national REDD+ 
activities are unfolding UN-REDD Programme (2013). The third phase, named “revenues ($)” 
by the UN-REDD Programme (2013), countries will receive payments for demonstrated 
emission reductions which must be measured, reported, and verified through a National 
Monitoring System.  
 
Arhin and Atela (2015) describes the three phased REDD+ process like this: 
“COP 16 in Mexico outlined a sequence of three broad phases to develop a 
REDD+ mechanism under the climate change convention. The sequence 
starts with basic capacity building and development of strategies and action 
plans (phase 1), followed by the implementation of national strategies and 
result-based demonstration activities (phase 2) to eventually fully measured, 
reported and verified reductions (phase 3).” (p.53) 
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Funding and support for REDD+ readiness activates can be achieved through bilateral 
agreements, through the UN-REDD Programme (technical support), and through the FCPF   
(Arhin & Atela, 2015). To achieve founding through the FCPF readiness fond, countries has 
to deliver several documents. First, to be considered, they have to submit a Readiness Plan Idea 
Note (R-PIN), and later a more extensive Readiness Plan Proposal (R-PP) (FCPF, 2018b). This 
includes a detailed plan, schedule, budget and activities that will contribute to the applicant’s 
REDD+ readiness and it is assessed by a participant committee (FCPF, 2013; FCPF, 2018b). 
The process and implementation is monitored through annual Progress Reports which is 
delivered by a delivery partner under the readiness fond (FCPF, 2018a). The FCPF (2018b) 
stresses that the inclusion and participation of Indigenous and forest dwelling people in the 
policy-making process related to Readiness plans.  
 
 REDD+ and the UN-REDD programme has in later years received both praise and critique 
and the challenges mentioned by Loft et al. (2017)1 have been noted and researched by several 
scholars. Scientists and activists have aired their concerns both in media, and in academic 
journals. Some have this done thorough studies questioning power relations, post-colonial 
structures and socio-economic consequences for local populations linked to REDD+ initiatives 
and projects (Benjaminsen & Svarstad, 2018; Beymer-Farris & Bassett, 2012; Bumpus & 
Liverman, 2011; Chomba et al., 2016; Leach & Scoones, 2015; Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 
2017). In the next section some of these studies are presented and discussed. 
 
2.1.3 REDD+ research within political ecology 
In their article reviewing the long history of carbon removal Carton et al. (2020) makes the 
reflection that “… the political character of carbon removal implies a need to ask what kind of 
“work” promises negative emissions actually preform, and for whom” (p.13). Røttereng 
(2018), as an example of this, asked what proponents of REDD+ and CCS had in common and 
found that those who strongly supports these two carbon removal mechanism “are generally 
petroleum-producing, large, and affluent, and they do not take on more ambitious mitigation 
targets” (p. 52). As mentioned in the section on negative emissions technology, some scholars 
have brought up the concern that the widespread focus on carbon removal and NETs is 
overshadowing other emission reduction measurements, while creating an opening for certain 
actors to keep going as they have before (Lövbrand, 2009). The findings in Røttereng (2018) 
 
1 See quote in previous section Loft et al. (2017) p. 44 
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research does seem to support this notion. However, even if carbon removal mechanisms like 
REDD+ achieve such focus and praise from certain actors with specific agendas, it does not 
mean that negative emissions technologies cannot contribute in a positive manner.  
 
REDD+ is not only supposed to reduce carbon emissions through afforestation, reforestation, 
and avoided deforestation and forest degradation. As discussed, it is supposed to address 
poverty, provide additional benefits to local and indigenous and local communities, and 
facilitate sustainable management. This is reflected in discourses where REDD+ is presented 
as an efficient “multi-win” mechanism to mitigate climate change in the “south” at the same 
time as providing socio-economic benefits to local populations and biodiversity conservation 
(Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2017).  
 
However, their research in Tanzania, Svarstad and Benjaminsen (2017) found that claims about 
safeguards like poverty reduction did not match reality. In contrast, “… the REDD project in 
Kondoa, which is highlighted as a great success by the main actors, has been implemented in 
a way that has not taken measures to avoid harm for the poor and vulnerable parts of the 
population” (Svarstad & Benjaminsen, 2017, p. 497). Despite this, both the Norwegian 
embassy and the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) both report positive results, results which 
are not empirically satisfying. The aim with this study was to show how the observed gap 
between reality, and claims about that reality, can be explained. To summarize, Svarstad and 
Benjaminsen (2017), found that the continued success of the success narrative was in the 
interests of actors who supported the project. Additionally, there were no safeguards or 
structures put in place to verify and/or examine outcomes of the project. 
 
Beymer-Farris & Bassett (2012) in their study on the REDD+ in the Rufiji Delta of Tanzania 
arrives at similar conclusions. Using the theoretical framework and literature written about 
marked environmentalism and environmental narratives, the authors identify environmental 
injustices related to “… access to, control, and management of natural resources.” (Beymer-
Farris & Bassett, 2012, p. 339). They argue that the narrative communicated by the 
stakeholders that are pushing for the REDD-readiness of the delta, legitimizes a shift from local 
to national and global control over the landscape.  
 
As shown by the two examples above there are a number of concerns related to REDD+ and 
REDD readiness activities. As Agrawal et al. (2011) wrote about in their review of REDD+ in 
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2011, the future success of REDD+ and REDD readiness initiatives depend on successful 
policy changes, production and availability of knowledge, flexible policies adapted to contexts 
and circumstances and more (p. 391).  
 
2.2 Changing landscapes, environmental degradation, and 
conservation 
As explained, afforestation and reforestation require some form of changing landscapes. In the 
following sections I present relevant literature regarding degradation and conservation.  
 
2.2.1 Degradation and marginalisation  
Degradation, the lowering of quality or reducing to a lower rank as it is defined in the 
dictionary, is a much discussed term in political ecology (Oxford University Press, 2020). The 
definition of environmental degradation is not as straightforward as presented by the 
dictionary. In contrast, the term present the researcher with several analytical challenges 
(Robbins, 2020). Johnson and Lewis (1995) defines degradation as “the substantial decrease in 
either or both of an area’s biological productivity or usefulness due to human interference” (p. 
2: as cited in: Robbins, 2020, p. 102). With this definition, there are several aspects that needs 
to be considered and especially the question: for who does the biological productivity and/or 
an area’s usefulness decline? In the context of agriculture, afforestation and reforestation will 
decrease the productivity and usefulness of the land. Landscapes that could have been used for 
crops is converted into forests and thus the decreased the yield of the land. However, in the 
context of carbon dioxide removal, or emissions reduction, afforestation and reforestation 
would increase biological productivity and the usefulness of the land. Contributing to carbon 
capture and storage in the forest’s biological material.  
 
This example shortly describes what Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) observed when defining 
and debating the “problem”: namely that land degradation is “a perceptual term” (p. 4). They 
discuss:  
“As a perceptual term, however, it is open to multiple interpretation. To a 
hunter or herder, the replacement of forest by savanna with greater 
capacity to carry ruminant would not be perceived as degradation. Not 
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would forest replacement by agricultural land be seen as degradation by a 
colonizing farmer. Usually there are a number of perceptions of physical 
changes of the biome on the part of actual or potential land-users. Usually, 
too, there is conflict of the use of land – whether it be between farmers and 
conservationists, pastoralists and peasants, small farmers and the state, 
developers and concerned landholders. Since degradation is a perceptual 
term, it must be expected that there will be a number of definitions in any 
situation. It is, therefore, essential that the researcher recognizes any such 
conflict offer the use of land and, therefore the definition of 
degradation”(Blaikie & Brookfield, 1987, p. 4) 
As illustrated by the two authors, how we perceive and define degradation has implications for 
the stories told about environmental degradation. It also illustrates the conflicts that arise when 
a researcher tries to define and measure degradation. Degradation for one community could 
mean the increase of usefulness to others. Consequently, what categories an actor chooses for 
defining and measuring degradation is inherently political. It tells us a story of who and what 
is important for political actors.  
 
Some of the dominant stories, or narratives, about degradation has been the target of many 
political ecology studies. As Robbins (2020) explains in his critical introduction to PE, the field 
has served as a hatchet, dispelling some of the dominant narratives concerning degradation by 
using a diverse set of perspectives, sometimes showing who and what is prioritized by political 
actors. As presented below these narratives are often based on simple, one-way explanations.  
 
One of the dominant narratives originate from the 1700s and the work by Thomas Malthus and 
his Essay on the Principle of Population. Simply put, the Malthusian logic state that rising 
populations will lead to environmental degradation because it places too much pressure on the 
resources that nature provides (Robbins, 2020). This narrative, that population growth leading 
to overpopulation will inevitably lead to ecoscarcity when overriding the natural carrying 
capacity, is dominating the contemporary narrative on human- environment interaction even 
today (Robbins, 2020). Some prominent examples of this is the 1972 Club of Rome report 
“Limits to growth”, the 1968 “Tragedy of the Commons” written by Garrett Hardin, and  the 
“Population Bomb” by Paul Ehrlich (Benjaminsen, 2015; Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015; 
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Robbins, 2020). The focus of Malthus was not just on population growth, but emphasised the 
population growth of the poor. Benjaminsen (2015) writes: 
According to Malthus (1798), population pressure on natural resources is 
the paramount cause of human misery. His “population law” postulated 
that the population growth of the poor inevitably will exceed the resource 
base represented by food production and cause widespread hunger and 
poverty.” (p. 354-355). 
In this conception of degradation, the problem is not just population growth, but also poverty; 
giving birth to the notion that poor people make poor land. This view is to a political ecologist 
apolitical. Meaning that this explanation of environmental degradation does not sufficiently 
include contextual factors like history, economy, culture, politics, or social aspects.  
 
Ecoscarcity and the notion that population growth or demographics can predict environmental 
degradation has, according to Robbins (2020), been shown to be flawed. Even if it is logic to 
think that population increase will lead to increased pressure on natural resources, looking at 
consumption rates in different countries shows another story. An example of this is the 
consumption of meat. In the United States the per capita average meat consumption is 124,1 
kg meat, compared to Niger in which the average citizen eats 12.75 kg meat per year (FAO, 
2020). Even if Niger had the second highest population growth rate of 3.8 in 2019, while the 
USA had a growth rate on 0.5 (The World Bank, 2019). Contrary to this example, for the 
ecoscarcity advocates the overpopulation – environmental degradation nexus is a problem for 
the developing world because of the high growth rates and high population numbers (Robbins, 
2020, p. 11).  
 
Another apolitical account for degradation is the narrative of modernization. In line with 
ecoscarcity proponents, modernization enthusiasts focus on the developing world. But here, 
the blame for environmental degradation is put on “ … inadequate adoption and 
implementation of “modern” economic techniques of management, exploitation, and 
conservation.” (Robbins, 2020, p. 14). This story follows a line of economic efficiency and 
economic development, relying on marked functions such as competition and privatization as 
regulators for environmental degradation (Robbins, 2020). There is no space in this chapter to 
get fully immersed in this discussion on modernization, as it is a big one. It is however 
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important to note that this narrative include the notion that commercialization of nature, 
popularly called “ecosystem services”, is a mechanism that will lead to “win-win” scenarios 
where environmental degradation is fought through the means of economic development 
(Robbins, 2020). 
 
This narrative can also be found in the famous Brundtland report. The report, Our Common 
Future, has had a huge impact on development agendas and narratives such as sustainable 
development and the concept of the green economy (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). It 
also accepts the idea that poverty is the leading cause for environmental degradation 
(Benjaminsen, 2015; see Brundtland Commission, 1987, Chapter 1: para. 37). A more detailed 
discussion on environmental narratives and the Brundtland report can be found under section 
2.2.3 Sustainability.  
 
The belief that poor people make poor land is not just accepted by Neo-Malthusian views, but 
also Marxist (Benjaminsen, 2015). While early scholars of political ecology used Marxist 
theory to criticise Neo-Malthusian explanations of degradation, Benjaminsen (2015) writes that 
they “… tended to accept the environmental impacts of human production described by the 
various Neo-Malthusian reports…” (p. 355). Despite this, the Marxist scholars contributed with 
important criticism of such Neo-Malthusian views on degradation by pointing out that this 
narrative blames poor people while ignoring social, economic, and political factors 
(Benjaminsen, 2015). The result of this was pointing out that seemingly neutral science had 
political consequences and thus becoming political.  
 
According to Robbins (2020), Marx and Engels considered environmental degradation as a 
product of capitalism as it acquires surplus production (p.50). In this view, the poor are victims 
of the market economy and instead of blaming degradation on these marginalized people, 
capitalism should be viewed as the culprit (Benjaminsen, 2015; Robbins, 2020). This 
explanation is under scrutiny in Benjaminsen’s (2015) article “Political Ecologies of 
Environmental Degradation and Marginalization”.  
 
Using an earlier case study (see Benjaminsen et al., 2010), he discusses the implication of 
“single-factor explanations” that can be found in the above degradation narratives. The case 
showed that the narrative on loss of soil fertility through the commodification of cotton 
production, was not scientifically proven  in their research (Benjaminsen et al., 2010). The 
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authors could not find any hard evidence that intensification of production had led to loss of 
soil fertility. Hence, as discussed in his 2015 article, critical political ecology should investigate 
all narratives making sure that the claimed environmental degradation is based on reliable 
scientific evidence. Further, the case study showed that the natural science of ecology should 
have a part to play in political ecology (Benjaminsen, 2015). Because without sound empirical 
material, the political ecologist might end up with accepting taken-for-granted degradation 
narratives which might or might not reflect the actual environmental situation (Benjaminsen, 
2015). Concluding that: 
“… a critical political ecology would imply a critical approach to all 
environmental narratives combined with a realist belief in science as a 
means to achieve a more accurate description and understanding of 
environmental realities” (Benjaminsen, 2015, p. 360)   
Another important point made by Benjaminsen (2015) is that later studies in political ecology 
has shown that degradation narratives in themselves “… are used as tools in struggles over land 
and natural resources, which often lead to further marginalization of vulnerable groups” (p. 
363). As Neo-Malthusian, Marxist and modernization narratives and accounts for degradation 
accept the sentiment that “poor people make poor land”, these narratives have been under 
political ecology inspection since the 1990s (Benjaminsen, 2015). These studies, which have 
looked into the link between marginalization and degradation, have shown that environmental 
degradation does not ultimately follow the logic of neither Marxist, Neo-Malthusian, or 
modernization explanations (Benjaminsen, 2015).  With this in mind, what are the lessons that 
can be learned from political ecology research related to degradation? And how do these 
accounts differ from the dominant narratives on degradation? 
 
One of the main themes within degradation research in political ecology is about challenging 
and questioning degradation narratives. Leach and Mearns (1996) does just this when they 
question the “perceived images of environmental change” in Africa. These images, or 
narratives, are according to the editors widely believed by “African governments, international 
donor agencies, and non-governmental organisations….” alike (p. 440). These stories and 
images about environmental change include overgrazing, desertification, fuelwood crisis, soil 
erosion, deforestation and overextraction of natural resources. The dominant explanation for 
these environmental changes is of Neo-Malthusian nature: they are caused by overpopulation 
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(Leach & Mearns, 1996, p. 440). The story surrounding of the fuelwood crisis serve as a good 
example. 
 
According to Leach and Mearns (1996), the fuelwood crisis is based on the belief that 
deforestation is caused by people that cut down trees for fuel and charcoal production. To deal 
with this, it is necessary to plant trees to combat rising deforestation which follows population 
growth. However, the gathering of fuelwood does not unescapably imply cutting down trees. 
There are several important aspects that is missing in the “fuelwood crisis” narrative (Leach & 
Mearns, 1996). One of those being that in sub-Sahara Africa the fuelwood is gathered “from 
surplus wood left over from clearing land for agriculture, or from lopping branches off trees 
standing on farms that are valued for many purposes besides fuel supply …” (Leach & Mearns, 
1996, p. 442). Another being when facing fuelwood shortage, people react by “[reducing] fuel 
consumption, or to plant or encourage the natural regeneration of trees” (Leach & Mearns, 
1996, p. 442). Hence, if the “fuelwood crisis” is exaggerated why does it persist? And who 
does it serve? 
 
Swift (1996) wondered the same thing when researching the persistence of the ‘desertification’ 
narrative. According to the author, the narrative has survived and thrived despite contradicting 
evidence. The desertification narrative can be traced back to the colonialization of west Africa 
and the work of E. P. Stebbing. Desertification is the process where drylands are degraded 
because of human misuse (Swift, 1996).  By asking who wins and who lose from the production 
and reproduction of this narrative Swift (1996) found that the narrative lends legitimacy to 
governments, aid agencies and some scientists when managing drylands. The losers on the 
other hand, were the “dryland farmers and herders, whose own control over resources was 
whittled away by central planning, land tenure reform, ranches and other good ideas from 
governments, the aid agencies and outside consultants.” (Swift, 1996, p. 90). This study shows 
how stories are power-laden tools in the management of environments. It shows that narratives, 
even if presented as outcomes of apolitical science, have political impacts with real life winners 
and losers; where stories of degradation lead to marginalization of people. 
 
Another degradation narrative that has been shown to not incorporate the whole story is another 
version of desertification; savannisation (Fairhead & Leach, 1996). Through careful studies of 
the forest-savanna landscape in Kissidougou, Fairhead and Leach (1996) found that the main 
narrative linked to deforestation in the area was false. It was long believed that local 
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communities had harvested from a previous large-scale forest until there was nothing left but 
small islands of forest. However, their research showed that these patches, which allegedly was 
remains of an earlier forest, was the exact opposite. These small forest islands were there 
because of the careful cultivation by local people (Fairhead & Leach, 1996). Despite this, the 
dominant narrative guides policy, which resulted in “… robbing valuable resources from local 
control, and placing their stewardship in the hands of a technical and managerial elite.” 
(Fairhead & Leach, 1996, p. 292). 
 
As Benjaminsen question Marxist and Neo-Malthusian explanations of degradation, Robbins 
(2020) makes a similar observation when reviewing the evidence for the degradation and 
marginalization thesis within political ecology. Namely that there is no straight-forward, 
scientifically generalisable answer that can explain the relationship between environmental 
destruction and human activity. “Rather, the degradation/marginalization thesis is less 
“generalizable” theory of some kind than an analytical framework in which to approach the 
problem” p. 161. Robbins (2020) elaborate this framework, stating that several questions have 
to be asked when studying degradation and marginalization: 
 (1) What rules continue to exist to manage these systems? (2) Are they 
changing? (3) Are these changes and failures a product of increasingly 
impoverished producers overextracting to offset losses and tighter margins 
or are they related to cultural transformations in perceptions of authority, 
or both? (4) What differences do management, enclosure, or other rules 
systems make? Do they really matter ecologically? Is there evidence of 
degradation? (Robbins, 2020, p. 163) 
This brings us back to the perceptual nature of degradation as well as the constructed drivers 
of such environmental change. As shown by the examples, there are many forces in play. 
Political ecologist has shown that degradation narratives are powerful tools that influence 
policies. Studies has shown that narratives on degradation can lead to marginalization and local 
loss of resources. The most important lesson to take from this literature is that critical 
evaluation of degradation narratives in combination with good empirical data to document the 
degradation process is important. There is little hope to tackle negative environmental changes 




Studies on degradation and marginalization has not become less relevant in today’s political 
climate. Climate change and belonging international negotiations are bringing the world 
together (or apart), to deal with the increasing pressure on environment and climate alike. 
Global initiatives and policies are being implemented to deal with deteriorating landscapes 
which impact the climate, and they too are based on stories, discourses, and narratives. The 
aim of this thesis is not to question the process of climate change, but to see how these policies 
are facilitating accumulation by dispossession in contrast to benefit-sharing. The next section 
focuses on forest conservation, with special attention to narratives that link conservation with 
climate change and carbon sequestration.  
 
2.2.2 Forest conservation 
In the field of Political Ecology (PE) there are, according to Robbins (2020), five themes that 
are common objects of inquiry. One of these, the Conservation and Control thesis,  looks into 
the outcomes of conservation efforts and why these efforts often fail (Robbins, 2020, p. 18). In 
a further explanation, Robbins (2020) writes  how conservation has been shown to function as 
a mechanism that moves the control over landscapes from the people that traditionally has 
worked the land over to other parties like government institutions and state authorities. This 
has been done in “… efforts to preserve “sustainability”, “community”, or “nature.””(Robbins, 
2020, p. 18).  
 
As with degradation, the concept or idea of nature and wilderness and its value is perceptual; 
it is constructed. Robbins (2020) writes: 
Forest, put simply, is not a natural phenomenon, object or idea, it is a social 
one, forged by convention and context, and enforced by its very taken-for-
grantedness. This becomes especially political when one considers that, 
depending on whether this bunch of trees is considered “forests” or 
“degradation,” significant state and international resources will be invested 
in its protection or its eradication.” (p. 118)  
Considering this, social construction of nature has implications. It had implication when 
European colonizers wanted to imprint their image of a “garden of eden” in Africa, it has 
implications for people when it is decided what forests should be protected and what landscapes 
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should be used for plantations, agriculture, or resource extractions. This is why it is important 
to consider these constructions and the narratives that helps create them. What is worth 
conserving and the decision to do so is not only a part of social construction, it is also a highly 
political process (Adams & Hutton, 2007).  
 
There are two main types of conservation narratives that have influenced how conservation 
have been implemented around the world. The first, dating back to the colonial era and the 
protection of the Yellowstone park from settlement and private ownership in 1872, is 
commonly referred to as “Fortress Conservation” or the  “fences and fines approach” (Hutton 
et al., 2005; National Park Service, 2020; Robbins, 2020). As implied by the names, this type 
of conservation model is based on the idea of a “wilderness” totally separated from human 
interference and resource extraction (Hutton et al., 2005). This approach was implemented all 
over the word as the colonial era claimed more territory, parks such as Parc National Albert, 
Kruger National Park and the Selous Game Reserve became of limits to people because the 
lands where labelled as “a lost Eden in need of protection and preservation” by the colonial 
rulers (Neumann, 1998, p. 80 as cited in; Adams & Hutton, 2007, p. 155). The “Fortress 
Conservation” narrative enjoyed hegemonic status until the late 1900s when the new narrative 
of “Community Conservation” progressively became the dominant model for conservation.  
 
In their review of the rise of community-based conservation models Hutton, Adams, and 
Murombedzi (2005) argue that there are several reasons why this new conservation narrative 
gained ground. While Robbins (2020) argue that alternative conservation narratives advanced 
because of the recognition that local people suffered under earlier conservation efforts, Hutton 
et al (2005) has found that the turnover was mostly due to other reasons. In the years when 
former colonies became newly independent states, conservationists and states became aware 
that it would be increasingly harder to continue fortress conservation policies as local people 
gained power to resist these policies through democratic institutions (Hutton et al., 2005). 
Hence, according to Hutton et al. (2005), the shift was done mainly out of conservationists self-
interest.  
 
While both Robbins (2020) and Hutton et al (2005) emphasise different reasons for the rise of 
community conservation, they both agree that awareness regarding negative impact on local 
populations has contributed to the shift towards community conservation. And just as 
community conservation was developed as a counter measure to fortress conservation, fortress 
 26 
conservation made a comeback to counter what was argued to be ineffective methods of 
biodiversity conservation. Hence, the narrative of community conservation in all its different 
nuances met a counter narrative during the 1990s and onward. This “Back to the Barriers” 
narrative, as Hutton et al (2005) named it, called for stricter conservation policies. Several 
papers published in the 1990s argue that community conservation does not serve the purpose 
of protecting biodiversity and that the approach is based on romanticised and unrealistic ideas 
of community as well as “unscientific postmodern influences” (Hutton et al., 2005, p. 348 ).  
 
There has been many changes and developments in the conservation debate since the colonizers 
protected huge areas in their colonies for their own enjoyment (Roe, 2008). Since then, when 
protected areas where set aside for elite hunting or for watching wildlife, the conservation 
debate has increasingly been linked to development (Roe, 2008). Dilys Roe has divided this 
“evolution” into five phases from the 1940s to the 2000s. In the second phase, the debate moved 
into the direction of arguing that nature and environmental degradation was inevitably linked 
with poverty. Roe (2008) writes: “The World Conservation Strategy … represented another 
milestone in the conservation-poverty debate by making the first link between poverty and 
ecological impacts” (p. 494).  Thus, this report gave birth to the idea that sustainable 
development needed to incorporate both development strategies and strategies for protecting 
nature.  
 
The next phase, 1980s to 1990s, was influenced by the emphasis on human rights and especially 
indigenous rights (Roe, 2008). This is when narratives on community conservation, inclusion, 
and participation dominated. It was believed that local benefits where an important part of 
conservation. Here, the merging between development and conservation came together under 
theories of sustainability. The fourth phase, 1990s to 2000s, was when the “Back to the 
Barriers” narratives and a shift towards increased protectionism in conservation re-emerged 
(Hutton et al., 2005; Roe, 2008). In contrast to this, the fifth phase was influences by an intense 
debate surrounding indigenous rights, evictions, and conservation NGOs spurred by Chapin’s 
book “A Challenge to Conservationists” (Roe, 2008). Roe (2008) further discusses the “future 
directions” of the conservation- development nexus, including “conservation, poverty and 
climate change” (p. 498). Preserving biodiversity, which have been one of the main goals of 
conservationists, have also claimed its part in the discourse regarding environment and 
development in the  2000s (Roe, 2008). However, the author predicts quite correctly that the 
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future of the debate on conservation and poverty/development will take place within the 
context of discussions on climate change.  
 
The discussions around conservation narratives is more complex and nuanced than presented 
here. However, it illustrates an introduction to the complexities and difficulties linked to 
conservation policies, narratives, and methods. As mentioned earlier, conservation policies and 
narratives has been one of the main focuses in research in the field of Political Ecology. Many 
scholars in the field have looked into conservation project and especially ones that have failed 
(Robbins, 2020).  
 
Conservation is in political ecology linked to control. The field is concerned with displacement, 
evictions, appropriation, indigenous people and the manifestation and shifts in power relations 
in processes of conservation. This is especially true for “fortress conservation” or approaches 
that emphasise enclosed protected areas (Adams & Hutton, 2007; Robbins, 2020).  In later 
years, narratives of forest conservation have been increasingly linked to climate change 
mitigation, carbon stocks, and negative emissions technologies (Leach & Scoones, 2015). This 
has not been lost on PE scholars. The introduction of sustainable development, ecosystem 
services, financialization of environments, carbon credits, green economy, carbon sinks, 
negative emission technology and more have yet again changed the social construction of 
conservation and consequently development policies. They have also changed the way we 
construct nature; shifting the construction of the value of nature, environment, or wilderness. 
Forests are no longer only protected for their important ecological and biodiversity functions, 
they are protected and conserved to serve as climate change mitigators.  
 
According to the IPCC report on the AFOLU sector, deforestation, agriculture and land use 
change is responsible for about 25% of annual carbon dioxide emissions worldwide (Smith et 
al., 2014). This makes the sector important for reducing emissions, as discussed in 2.1 Climate 
Change Mitigation and Negative emissions technologies. The global negotiations on the 
reduction of emissions started after the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) was established in 1992 (Bumpus & Liverman, 2011). The Kyoto Protocol (1997) 
was an operationalization of the UNFCCC, which binds developed countries to reducing their 
emissions. This was based on the individual countries 1990 emissions (Bumpus & Liverman, 
2011; UNFCCC, n.d.).  
 
 28 
However, the Kyoto Protocol also allowed for carbon offsetting; the reduction of emissions 
through carbon markets, where countries can buy carbon stocks from reduction projects 
elsewhere (Liverman, 2009). There are several mechanisms and frameworks introduced to 
create such markets including voluntary markets initiated by NGOs and private firms, the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), and Joint Implementation (JI) (Bumpus & Liverman, 2011). 
Only reforestation and afforestation could at this time be converted into credits. The 
introduction of converting existing forests into carbon credits came later, with the 2007 
UNFCCC negotiations in Bali (Bumpus & Liverman, 2011). These markets, which have their 
roots in international negotiations, have resulted in widespread commodification of nature 
(Liverman, 2009).  
 
2.3 Sustainability and sustainable management 
Sustainable development became a dominant narrative in the world development agenda after 
the publication of the Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development 
(WCED) “Our Common Future” also known as “the Brundtland Report” in 1987. The 
sustainable development narrative has since grown, evident in the United Nations declaration 
of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which encompasses the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDG). The concept of sustainable development is defined in the report: 
“Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs.” (Brundtland Commission, 1987, Chapter 2: para. 1)  
Sustainability is a concept that is highly discussed amongst scholars and practitioners alike and 
the concept is interpreted in various ways (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). However, the 
story of the concept of sustainability started earlier. 
 
In the 1970s the discussions around the concept of sustainability, or ecodevelopment as it was 
called then, presented economic- and population growth as problematic because of planetary 
boundaries. (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). The consensus during this period was that 
growth was a major obstacle combating environmental degradation and biodiversity (Gómez-
Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). The problem of environmental degradation would be fought 
through state regulation and planning (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). This narrative 
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changed after two specific events according to Gómez-Baggethun and Naredo (2015). The first 
being a response from the US chief diplomat Henry Kissinger regarding ecodevelopment. The 
second being the report “Our Common Future”, which was presented in 1987 by the World 
Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). This report, widely known as the 
Brundtland report, changed the narrative on sustainability. 
 
In the report, economic growth is no longer a hinder for a healthy environment. Rather, it is 
presented as a solution (Gómez-Baggethun & Naredo, 2015). One of the arguments in the 
report is that the slow economic growth in the 1980s led to increased pressure on the 
environment. The report reads: 
“The heaviest burden in international economic adjustment has been 
carried by the world's poorest people. The consequence has been a 
considerable increase in human distress and the overexploitation of land 
and natural resources to ensure survival in the short term”. (Brundtland 
Commission, 1987, Chapter 1: para. 37) 
Further, because of the burden poverty has on the environment (as described by the quote), the 
report emphasizes that economic growth is necessary to release some of the pressure on nature. 
The logic goes that if people are lifted out of absolute poverty, the demand on nature will fall, 
there will be an economic shift, which aim to be “… less Material- and energy-intensive and 
more equitable in its impact.” (Brundtland Commission, 1987, Chapter 2: para. 35). As 
discussed in the chapter 2.2.1 degradation and marginalisation, this is an apolitical view of 
environmental degradation.  
 
Sustainable development and forest conservation are tied to together through the 15th SDG 
“Life on Land”. The goal is to “Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial 
ecosystems, sustainable manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land 
degradation and halt biodiversity loss” (United Nations (UN), 2016). In 2008 various UN 
agencies created a programme to mitigate climate change through the combat of deforestation 
in a sustainable way. This UN Programme, Reducing emissions for Deforestation and forest 
Degradation (REDD) supports 65 partner countries, one of which is Kenya (UN-REDD 
Programme, 2017; UN-REDD Programme, 2019c).  
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3. Discourses, Structures, and Actors: The study of 
Power in Political ecology 
In a special section of the Journal of Political Ecology, Svarstad et al. (2018) discussed different 
theoretical approaches to power in Political Ecology. Power is a central theme within the field, 
but there is a lack of explicit elaboration of how political ecologists understand and utilize 
power perspectives in research (Svarstad et al., 2018). There are three power perspectives that 
are recurring in the field. These, actor oriented, neo-Marxist, and poststructural approaches, 
provide “a set of rich and nuanced insights into how power is manifested in environmental 
conflicts and governance” (Svarstad et al., 2018, p. 350). The three authors argue for, and 
conclude, that adopting a combination of these perspectives in academic analysis can provide 
a more holistic understanding of human-environmental governance and conflicts.  
 
In this study, the main question is linked to how a certain environmental policy process 
facilitate a process of accumulation by dispossession. This is a neo-Marxist approach which 
can provide insights into how new forms of environmental governance in the age of climate 
change ends up promoting dispossession and loss of resources for local population in contrast 
to benefit-sharing. Because of this, the focus of this theoretical framework will be on 
accumulation by dispossession. Regrettably, because of the limitations set by the scope of this 
study, the inclusion of poststructural and actor-oriented power perspectives is not included. 
However, I would like to point out that the inclusion of these power perspective would have 
contributed to a more nuanced and holistic analysis and understanding of the REDD readiness 
process and policies.  
 
3.1 Primitive accumulation, accumulation by dispossession and 
conservation 
Marxist and neo-Marxist theory have been influential in the field of political ecology (Robbins, 
2020; Svarstad et al., 2018). Marxists understanding of how marginalization of people in the 
capitalist political and economic structures leads to environmental degradation served as 
influential counter explanations to neo-Malthusian and modernist accounts for degradation 
(Benjaminsen, 2015). However, as discussed under section 2.2.1 Degradation, this chain of 
explanation does not always sit easy with later research (Benjaminsen et al., 2010; 
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Benjaminsen, 2015). Despite this, there has been a renewal of interest in Marxist thinking with 
the introduction of the concept “accumulation by dispossession” (Benjaminsen, 2015). Harvey 
(2003) interpretation of Marx’s idea “primitive accumulation” has later been used to look at 
current processes linking  dispossession to capital accumulation (Benjaminsen, 2015). In this 
section I will first discuss Marx’s idea of primitive accumulation and Harveys (2003) 
continuation of the term under the name of accumulation by dispossession. Then, I will discuss 
how this concept have been used in studies within political ecology and development studies, 
with specific emphasis on studies related to conservation.  
 
According to Glassman (2006) primitive accumulation was for Marx the “’historical process 
of divorcing the producer from the means of production’, transforming ‘the social means of 
subsistence and production into capital’ and ‘the immediate producers into wage laborers’” 
(Marx, 1967, p. 714; as cited in Glassman, 2006, p. 610). This process was to Marx a central 
part of capitalism, where surplus was derived from soil and laborer, to accumulate wealth 
somewhere else or for someone else (Robbins, 2020; Svarstad et al., 2018). Harvey (2003) 
states that “… primitive accumulation as Marx described it, … entailed taking land, say, 
enclosing it, and expelling a resident population to create a landless proletariat, and then 
releasing the land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation” (p. 149). To Marx, 
this process was multidimensional, including the creation of landless laborers, new forms of 
property rights and land ownership and consequently consolidation of capital, as well as 
changing the relationship between humans and their environments (Glassman, 2006). Harvey 
(2003) makes the same observation:  
“A closer look at Marx’s description of primitive accumulation reveals a wide 
range of processes. These include the commodification and privatization of 
land and the forceful expulsion of peasant populations; the conversion of 
various forms of property rights (common, collective, state, etc.) into 
exclusive private property rights; the suppression of rights to the commons; 
the commodification of labour power and the suppression of alternative 
(indigenous) forms of production and consumption; colonial, neo-colonial, 
and imperial processes of appropriation of assets (including natural 
resources); the monetization of exchange and taxation, particularly of land; 
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the slave trade; and usury, the national debt, and ultimately the credit 
system as radical means of primitive accumulation.” (p. 145) 
According to Harvey (2003), the state has played a key role in these processes linked to 
primitive accumulation by facilitating the necessary changes.  
 
Marx viewed this multidimensional process of primitive accumulation to be limited to a 
historical phase, hence he called it ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ accumulation (Glassman, 2006; 
Harvey, 2003). Harvey (2003), and Glassman (2006) after him, did however observe that 
primitive accumulation is an ongoing process. Hence, Harvey (2003) renamed this 
multidimensional process to ‘accumulation by dispossession’. The reason for this is that it 
seemed strange to call an ongoing process as something ‘original’ or ‘primitive’. He writes: 
“All the features of primitive accumulation that Marx mentions have remained powerfully 
present withing capitalism’s historical geography up until now.” (Harvey, 2003, p. 145). 
 
Accumulation by dispossession within neoliberalism is a necessary process to deal with the 
problem of overaccumulation (Harvey, 2003). A crisis of overaccumulation is a situation where 
accumulated capital have nowhere to go, and there is limited opportunities for reinvestment in 
existing markets (Harvey, 2003). The solution to this problem is to open up non-capitalist 
domains for investment and trade. This relates back to the multidimensional processes 
described by  Harvey (2003) in the quote above. He uses multiple examples to illustrate how 
these different processes have materialized in the expansion of neoliberalism such as 
privatization of national industry or common property resources, or the commercialization of 
culture and history (p. 145-146). Further he explains how these processes within accumulation 
by dispossession solves the problem of overaccumulation: 
“Overaccumulation … is a condition where surpluses of capital … lie idle with 
no profitable outlets in sight. The operative term here, however, is capital 
surplus. What accumulation by dispossession does is to release a set of 
assets (including labour power) at very low … cost. Overaccumulated capital 
can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn them into profitable use.” 
(Harvey, 2003, p. 149) 
In his book, Harvey (2003) emphasizes how the process of privatization is “The Cutting Edge 
of Accumulation by dispossession” (p.157). Neo-liberal globalization, which intensified in the 
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1970s and further under Thatcher and Reagan, brought about a wave of privatization and 
liberalization worldwide. Through institutions like the World Bank, the WTO, and the IMF 
and trade agreements like NAFTA, this process became increasingly transnational (Harvey, 
2003). This process of liberalization and privatization opened up for new opportunities for 
accumulation by dispossession where common resources and spaces where set free for 
investment into new territories (Harvey, 2003).  
 
In later years, scholars have published studies arguing that the emergence of the green economy 
and the commodification of nature (e.g. through ecosystem services and carbon credits) have 
led to new opportunities for accumulation by dispossession. As discussed below, the 
commodification of nature has opened up for new arenas where accumulation can be derived 
from landscapes through, for example, carbon credits.  
 
Benjaminsen and Bryceson (2012) for instance, uses the lens of accumulation of dispossession 
in their study on conservation and blue/green grabbing in Tanzania. Here, the process of 
accumulation by dispossession did not transfer ‘common enclosures’ to private ownership. 
However, the implementation of wildlife and marine conservation has led to “… combination 
of dispossession of previous users and capital accumulation by some powerful actors” resulting 
in a situation where “Non-capitalist spaces and resources are opened up for accumulation 
through the combination of tourism and conservation (Benjaminsen & Bryceson, 2012, p. 350, 
336). According to Benjaminsen and Bryceson (2012) this process was enabled and justified 
through narratives of degradation. 
 
Kelly (2011) on the other hand uses the lens of primitive accumulation when looking at 
conservation practices. She makes the same observation, that enclosing common landscapes 
through conservation is not a process of privatization. It is however a process where “… 
protected areas create and reproduce the means of capitalist production and, through neoliberal 
conservation practices, are able to become capital themselves in the form of environmental 
services, spectacles, and genetic storehouses.” (Kelly, 2011).  
 
There is one important point which have not yet been covered. Because to answer how 
accumulation by dispossession is facilitated, it is necessary to ask how this transition come to 
pass. How and why does states or other actors open up their non-capitalized spaces for market 
integration, and what makes them do so?  
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According to Marx and his observations, primitive accumulation was sometimes enforced 
through a violent enforcement (Glassman, 2006). With irony, Marx observes: 
 “The discovery of gold and silver in the Americas, the extirpation, 
enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the 
beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of 
Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalized 
the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production’ (Marx, 1967, p. 751 as 
cited in Glassman, 2006, p.610).  
However violent the colonialization of distant continents where, the process of 
proletarianization, which is one of the central processes in primitive accumulation, was not 
solely enforced through violence. Rather it was a combination of several structural changes. 
Harvey (2003) writes: 
The process of proletarianization … entails a mix of coercion and of 
appropriations of pre-capitalist skills, social relations, knowledges, habits of 
mind, and beliefs on the part of those being proletarianized. … In some 
instances the pre-existing structures have to be violently repressed as 
inconsistent with labour under capitalism, but multiple accounts now exists 
to suggest that they are just as likely to be co-opted in an attempt to forge 
some consensual as opposed to coercive basis for working-class formation. 
Primitive accumulation, in short, entails appropriation and co-optation of 
pre-existing cultural and social achievements as well as confrontation and 
suppression.” (p. 146). 
This explains that primitive accumulation is not always a violent process, but a process where 
shifts in the ways of thinking and acting takes place so that primitive accumulation and 
belonging proletarianization happens in consensus with those who are being formed into a 
working class. This is not to say that this is a struggle free process. 
 
In the case of accumulation by dispossession there are many different processes that facilitate 
accumulation by dispossession (see Harvey, 2003, p. 149-156). It can be national policy 
changes, like the privatization of social housing in England under Thatcher’s economic policies, 
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or the privatization of water in South-Africa at recommendation of the World Bank (Harvey, 
2003). Another example is how the USA flooded Mexican corn marked under the NAFTA 
accord. Here, cheap and subsidized corn entered the Mexican marked that made local producers 
unable to compete. What followed was loss of land, starvation, and massive urbanization 
(Harvey, 2003). These examples of accumulation by dispossession did not happen without 
struggles, the Zapatista movement in Mexico exemplify this, but nevertheless a process of 
privatization, proletarianization and enclosures of common land did win through.  
 
How can this be explained? I argue that the study of power can contribute to understanding 
this. Power comes in many forms, money, arms and weapons, ideas, economic structures, 
political structures and so on.  
4. Research design and methodology 
The aim of this study is to identify to how and to what degree the Kenyan REDD+ readiness 
process facilitates accumulation by dispossession in contrast to benefit-sharing. To do this, I 
have analysed policy documents relevant for Kenya’s REDD+ process and the Mau Forest 
Conservation project. I have chosen to focus on relevant documents, using them as objects of 
study. In this section, I account for the methodological choices I have made. This includes 
discussions about research design, research strategy and method.  
 
Before going into the nuts and bolts of the methodology, it is necessary to comment on the 
world situation today. This study was initially designed as a field study, which where to include 
in depth interviews with different actors involved in the Mau Forest Complex Conservation 
project. The field studies where to be conducted in the spring of 2020. However, due to the 
outbreak of the Covid19 pandemic, this was put on hold. As the situation did not improve, it 
became clear that field studies were no longer an option. I re-designed the study to include 
online interviews, but after considering questions of reliability and validity, this was discarded. 
Not being able to travel to Nairobi in person, developing a network, and thus not getting an 
opportunity to develop an understanding of different actors and their roles, would in itself be 
one problem. Another would be that without a physical presence, I would be in danger of 
misrepresenting different groups and actors. I also imagine that the electronic approach would 
exclude the opportunity to talk to certain actors, those without access to necessary facilities 
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and so on. For these reasons I have decided to look at the current global situation as an 
opportunity to focus on documents as samples for analysis.  
 
When choosing a research strategy and a research design there are several aspects to be 
considered. What is the relationship between research and theory in this study? What 
epistemological and ontological positions will guide the knowledge production of this study? 
What research strategy, qualitative or quantitative, will serve to derive answers to the questions 
asked? Moreover, what research design and research method are fitting for the purpose of the 
study?  
 
When conduction social research, all these questions has to be considered and answered. And 
more importantly, whatever strategy, design and position the researcher uses, the choices have 
to be guided by one communality: how to answer the research questions. In this chapter, I will 
present and discuss my methodological choices. The research has been designed to best answer 
the research questions and objectives of this study.  
 
First, there is a section on the relationship between this study and theory before moving over 
to epistemological and ontological considerations. Then, I discuss the research strategy, 
explaining why I have chosen to use a qualitative strategy. I continue with a presentation of the 
research design and finish by discussing the chosen research method. Under subchapter 4.2, I 
will explain in detail how the research was conducted, what data was used and why.  
 
4.1 Social Research Strategy 
4.1.1 An inductive approach to research 
The relationship between research and theory is often determined by the research questions 
and thus the research strategy. A study using a deductive strategy, aims to test out existing 
theories through the use of hypotheses (Bryman, 2016). This type of strategy is typically used 
in quantitative studies while inductive research strategy, as Bryman (2016) writes, is typical to 
qualitative research. While deductive studies test out theory through a hypothesis to confirm 
or reject theoretical claims, inductive research turns this process on its head. In using an 
inductive approach to research, theory is the outcome of process (Bryman, 2016). This 
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approach is used to further develop theory, or to generate a further theoretical understanding 
of a phenomenon that is not yet been thoroughly researched.   
 
With this said, there is usually an interplay between inductive and deductive approaches 
(Bryman, 2016). Studies using a deductive approach might develop new theory through the 
discussions and analysis of results, just as studies using inductive approaches does not exist in 
a theory vacuum. Lune and Berg (2017, p. 189) writes: “In many circumstances, the 
relationship between a theoretical perspective and certain messages involves both inductive 
and deductive approaches”.  
 
This study does not aim to test out a hypothesis derived from theoretical assumptions. Rather, 
the objective is to develop a deeper understanding how negative emissions technologies like 
afforestation and reforestation, or as in this case REDD+, change governing structures and thus 
facilitate a process of accumulation by dispossession.  The development of this understanding 
will contribute as a comment to what was observed by Carton et al. (2020) and Minx et al. 
(2017): namely the need for mainstream negative emissions technology research to consider 
lessons learned from already existing carbon removal projects. To do this, this study uses an 
inductive research strategy to derive lessons from the gathered material. Nevertheless, the focus 
of this study and the research question is derived from theory and existing literature. And as 
Lune and Berg (2017) observed, this study thus includes elements from both inductive and 
deductive approaches.  
 
The inductive approach informs the relationships between theory and research. However it also 
follows the general direction of the research strategy; namely a qualitative approach (Bryman, 
2016). Qualitative research does not aim to quantify data to test theoretical assumptions in the 
same way that quantitative strategies does (Bryman, 2016). Rather it focuses on meanings, 
words, narratives, discourses (i.e. texts in its different forms), and aim to understand different 
phenomena or processes through the study of these (Bryman, 2016). Hence, the 
epistemological and ontological orientation of qualitative research is quite different from those 
of quantitative approaches.  
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4.1.2 Epistemological and ontological considerations 
In qualitative research, the epistemological and ontological considerations differ from the 
quantitative tradition which is grounded in natural science and positivism (Bryman, 2016). To 
explain the difference between these two traditions, the work by Hollis and Smith (1991) 
regarding research traditions within social sciences and International Relations can be 
informative.  
 
According to them, the social sciences can be divided into two intellectual traditions. One was 
born out of the rise of natural sciences and the belief that through principles of objectivity 
science can explain human affairs much in the same way it can explain the manner in which 
nature works (Hollis & Smith, 1991). This tradition of “explaining”, as Hollis and Smith (1991) 
named it, seeks to explain causes through the identification of which underlying factors leads 
to a certain situation. The goal is to be able to generalize what factors reoccurs in the same type 
of situations (Hollis & Smith, 1991). The epistemological orientation of natural sciences and 
positivism that is the foundation of this tradition, and the ontological orientation is that of 
objectivism (Bryman, 2016). Meaning that in the tradition of explaining, which is associated 
quantitative research methods, the belief is that knowledge can be and should be obtained and 
developed through observation, measurements, causality, generalization, and replication 
(Bryman, 2016). The ontological orientation of objectivism that follows is “that social 
phenomena confront us as external facts that are beyond our reach or influence” hence that 
social phenomenon exists outside of human interpretation (Bryman, 2016, p. 29) 
 
The other tradition was born later in the nineteenth-century. Hollis and Smith (1991) called 
this intellectual tradition for “understanding” comparing it to an inside story which seeks to 
mine out the meaning of social interactions and phenomena. The epistemological orientation 
of such an approach is based on the notion of interpretivism (Bryman, 2016). In contrast to 
positivism, interpretivism argues that human action and the social world is distinct from the 
natural world and that social sciences needs a different epistemology to reflect this (Bryman, 
2016). More here 
 
The ontological orientation at the basis of this, is that actors or objects are indeed constructed 
through language and that this has implications. One of the research questions is asking how 
environmental degradation is constructed, because as discussed under 2.2.1 Degradation and 
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2.2.2 Conservation, the way nature and environmental degradation has consequences for how 
it is dealt with. Consequently, this study is grounded in an ontology which sees reality as 
constructed. This does not imply an ontology which rejects the materiality of objects. Rather, 
it accepts the notion that out interpretation of reality is constructed through texts and that this 
has implications for how humans act, govern, and deal with said reality.  
 
Given these considerations, the epistemological and ontological orientations that lie at the heart 
of this thesis is those connected to the tradition of “understanding”. This is because this study 
does not aim to measure or quantify elements that contribute to the process of accumulation by 
dispossession. Instead it is grounded in the tradition that seeks to understand the inner workings 
of environmental governance. Further, to be able to identify how the Kenyan REDD+ process 
and the Mau Forest Complex conservation facilitate accumulation by dispossession, I argue 
that it is necessary to interpret language, narratives, or discourses that together create a 
framework where certain environmental interventions are justified. The goal is to contribute to 
an understanding of why different measures are put in place and how they are made possible. 
In addition, it can contribute to understanding if different construction of different actors 
underwrite how they are involved and what positions they are given. These underlying 
orientations, epistemology, ontology, inductivity, all point in the direction of a qualitative 
research strategy.  
 
4.2 Qualitative research  
According to Lune and Berg (2017) “we adopt more qualitative methods when we need a 
deeper understanding of the exceptions and special cases, or when we want to understand the 
meanings and preferences that underlie those larger patterns. Quantitative work leans toward 
“what” questions, while qualitative tends toward “why” and “how.” (p.12). In contrast to 
quantitative research, which is based on counting and measuring, qualitative methods can be 
used as a tool to understand how people interpret and give meaning to different realities 
(Bryman, 2016; Lune & Berg, 2017). This is done through the study of words, texts, and images 
that describe the different aspects of our reality. And, as discussed earlier, these descriptions 




When asking “How does the REDD+ policy process in Kenya facilitate accumulation by 
dispossession as opposed to fair benefit-sharing?” I am aiming to understand how the policy 
documents are framing different aspects relevant for how the REDD+ policy is implemented. 
This is reflected in the sub questions. A qualitative methodology helps serve this aim, as it 
enables  
 
4.2.1 Research design- a case study 
A research design is a framework which guides the “collection and analysis of data” (Bryman, 
2016). In other words, it is a plan for how to execute the research. This study is designed as a 
case study, which can be divided into two levels of analysis. One is on the national level 
concerning the Kenyan REDD+ framework, the other is sub-national focusing on how this 
policy is being implemented through the conservation of the Mau Forest Complex. But what 
does it mean to have a case study research design? 
 
Following Bryman (2016), a case study “entails the detailed and intensive analysis of a single 
case”. This can be an event, a location, a community, an organization, a person, and so on 
(Bryman, 2016). In this case, the case is focusing on a specific environmental policy in a 
national and sub-national context. There are different types of case studies; critical, 
extreme/unique, exemplifying, revelatory, and longitude cases. Given what the political 
ecology literature have found when studying environmental conservation and environmental 
governance in the age of carbon sequestration, this study falls under the category of an 
exemplifying case. This does not mean that the case is representative for other similar 
situations, rather it means that it can“… [exemplify] a broader category of which it is a 
member.” (Bryman, 2016, p. 62).  
 
4.2.2 Population 
As discussed in the introduction of this methodology chapter, I have chosen to use documents 
as my object of study. The population of documents can be defined as all documents (reports, 
media stories, government policies, academic studies) which have informed, commented, and 
established Kenya’s REDD+ policy and the Mau Forest Complex conservation policy. In this 
study, all of these documents could be of interest. However, because of the scope of a master 
thesis, the selection of units of analysis is limited to the policy documents written and published 
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by the Kenyan Government. The gathered material has been used to inform the case which is 
outlined in the next chapter.  
 
4.2.3 Data collection 
The documents that were reviewed for this study, the population, was collected from websites 
relevant for the case. These include organisations and institutions that are involved with 
REDD+ and Kenya’s REDD+ process as well as the Mau Forest Complex restoration and 
conservation efforts.  
 
















The selection of the units of analysis was achieved through a process of reviewing the collected 
documents. The remaining documents where used to get an overview of the processes. This 
has contributed to an overview of both the REDD+ and the Mau Forest Complex policy 
process. Documents that did not reference to Kenya, the Mau Forest Complex and 
REDD/REDD+ was discarded. 
 
All documents where downloaded, redownloaded and printed on the 14th of October 2020.  
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4.2.4 Sample selection approach 
The sample selection strategy is purposive sampling. The reason for this is that the samples 
chosen has to be applicable to the research objective (Bryman, 2016, p. 408). In this study I 
aims to understand how the Kenyan REDD+ policy facilitates accumulation by dispossession 
in contrast to benefit sharing. Lune and Berg (2017, p. 176) writes “…the unit of analysis 
defines what the case study is focusing on (what the case is), such as individuals, a group, an 
organization, a city, and so forth”. Because of this I have selected two documents that together 
form the backbone of the Kenyan REDD+ policy and one document that has informs the 
restoration of the Mau Forest Complex. Together these documents are the units of analysis. 
These documents are chosen because they serve the purpose of this research. The three policy 
documents form the framework for the REDD+ actions and the restoration efforts in the Mau 
Forest Complex. They are the core of the policies that are of interest to this study. 
 
4.2.5 Content analysis and documents as data 
As mentioned earlier, this is a desk study where the relevant documents serve as data. To 
answer the research question, I have performed a content analysis of the units of analysis. To 
do this, I initially identified three overarching themes. These where created with the 
background information from both the literature, the theory, and the case in addition to an early 
review of the relevant documents. The three themes are divided into two categories. The first 
focuses on structures and actors, while the second focus on the framings. This enabled me to 
get to know the documents, and identify governance structures.  
 
After this initial review, I created four categories for analysis. These are: 
• Forest governance structures,  
• Local communities, indigenous people and forest governance, 
• Property rights, ownership and commodification of forests,  
• Benefit-sharing and resource access  
The finding and relating discussion are structured under these themes. In order to tease out 
relevant extractions to be analysed, I used search words in combination with the initial review.  
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4.3 Reflections  
When designing a research and choosing a method it is important that the researcher is aware 
that these choices have consequences for the knowledge produced. The methodology of a 
research is not value free, and the way we ask questions are not without implication (Berg & 
Lune, 2016).  
 
When I ask; “How does the REDD readiness process in Kenya facilitate accumulation by 
dispossession as opposed to fair benefit-sharing”, I make the assumption that accumulation by 
dispossession is taking place in the Kenyan context. There are two reasons why I framed the 
research question like this. The first is that I had prior knowledge of the conservation of the 
Mau Forest Complex, which indicated that accumulation by dispossession was taking place. 
The second is that when asking “how does…” instead of “Does…” I open up the question. This 
thesis is not aiming to answer if the policy does or does not, it is aiming to see how and in what 
ways the frameworks can facilitate governance structures that promote land appropriation to 
the benefit of certain, usually powerful, actors.  
 
There are shortcomings to this research design. As discussed at the end of chapter 3.1, I believe 
that a more holistic power approach could have provided more a nuanced perspective on carbon 
removal strategies and accumulation by dispossession. On ground observations and interviews 






5. The case: REDD+ planning and implementation in 
Kenya 
In this section I present a short background of the context relevant to understanding Kenya’s 
REDD readiness programme and the Mau forests conservation project. First, I present a 
historical overview of forest governance in Kenya.  Then, go through Kenya’s REDD readiness 
programme. In the next section I outline the ecological importance of the Mau Forest since this 
is an important part of the justification to conserve the forests. From there, I explain the 
conservation process, the efforts taken to protect the forest as well as the part it plays in Kenya’s 
REDD readiness programme. Moving on, I go into the contemporary situation in the forest 
today. 
 
5.1 Forest governance in Kenya 
5.1.1 Historical factors 
State governance of forests in Kenya dates back to the British colonial regime. Before this, 
forests were managed by local communities (Klopp & Sang, 2011). To understand the current 
situation in the Mau Forest Complex and how the REDD+ programme facilitates accumulation 
by dispossession, it is important to contemplate the political, economic, social and historical 
context from which this contemporary situation has taken form.  
 
Kenya has a history of land appropriation. In the colonial period in Kenya the British allocated 
land for white settlers (Klopp & Sang, 2011).  They introduced a centralized land management 
system where they controlled landscapes by mapping and establishing boarders (Klopp & 
Sang, 2011; Standing & Gachanja, 2014). The centralised land management system and their 
establishment of boarders allowed the British to allocate land and define where local and 
indigenous people where to live. Consequently, portions of the Kenyan population were 
dispossessed and relocated into ethnic reserves (Klopp & Sang, 2011, p. 128). 
 
After independence the British centralised system of governing land and forest continued 
(Klopp and Sang, 2011). After a period of revolt leading up to the Kenyan Independence, land 
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was transferred from European settlers to Kenyans through a land reform (Sundet & Moen, 
2009). However, instead of being a redistribution of land, ownership was transferred to political 
elites in Africa. Sundet and Moen (2009) reflects over the implication of this when they write: 
 
“… when power was handed over from the colonial administration to the 
Kenyans in 1963, some of the key characteristics of today’s political situation 
were already in place: a centralised state with a powerful executive, political 
conflict around the issue of inequality, particularly with reference to land, 
and a tradition of violent confrontation between the state and popular 
movements in opposition.” (p. 6) 
 
Despite this, in the period between independence and the 1980s, Kenyan forest governance 
was viewed as well-run, and the stability of this forest management resulted in surplus 
production of timber (Standing & Gachanja, 2014). However, during the 1980s and the 1990s 
a forest management crisis started to take form, and the forest department that was responsible 
for forest governance, became increasingly corrupt. This happened in a period where there was 
a massive population increase in Kenya. Standing and Gachanja (2014) writes: 
“But it was not simply the pressure of a burgeoning population that 
challenged Kenyan forest governance; the rampant corruption that began 
to define Kenya’s forestry sector reflected wider transformations in 
governance. The late 1980s and early 1990s saw political corruption become 
pervasive in Kenya. According to some observers, contributing factors 
include structural adjustment (because of the downsizing of state 
departments and the rapid introduction of privatisation) and the 
introduction of a competitive multiparty political system.” (p. 4) 
 
In the same period there was a shift in political power when Daniel arap Moi became president 
after the death of Kenyatta in 1978 (Sundet & Moen, 2009). In the period after 1990 there was 
a trend of de-gazetting state forests, which means to transfer public land into private ownership, 
and forests were often allocated into the hands of the political elite (Standing & Gachanja, 
2014). Klopp and Sang (2011) makes a similar observation when they write  
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“Throughout Kenya’s history … settlement schemes have allowed those in 
power to mediate who has access to land. In practice this meant that 
political supporters, friends and relatives were favoured, and at times the 
settlements expanded beyond their original borders. This is one reason why 
the families of Kenya’s past two presidents own vast tracts of land and 
Kenya has some of the highest levels of land inequality in the world.” (p. 129) 
 
 The issues and details of corruption, land allocation and forest governance in this period is to 
vast to include here. However, there is one incident that can illustrate this forest management 
crises which also relates to the Mau Forest Complex. This is the Ogiek Settlement scheme. 
This scheme, and belonging allocation of land in the Mau forest, is according to Klopp and 
Sang (2011) “… one of the clearest demonstrations of how power and patronage dynamics 
caused massive deforestation as well as dispossession of the Ogiek.” (p.129).  
 
The settlement scheme was enabled by the project Kenya Indigenous Forest Conservation 
Programme (KIFCON). Funded by the UK, the project found that it would be of benefit to the 
conservation if the Ogieks were to be resettled together in a portion of the Mau forest (Klopp 
& Sang, 2011). This led to a settlement scheme where KIFCON was to provide a list of Ogiek 
people to be resettled (ibid.). However, the correctness of the list was in doubt because of the 
difficulties with gathering correct information on the Ogiek. The list handed from KIFCON to 
government evolved from approximately 1800 families, to 3500. When the settlement scheme 
took effect in 1996, the list included 9000 families, very few of these where Ogiek (Klopp & 
Sang, 2011). Later investigations showed that the Ogiek settlement scheme amongst others did 
not serve their public purpose, but was rather used to allocate land to the benefit of the powerful 
(Klopp & Sang, 2011). Concluding that, as discussed, after independence landscapes and 
forests continued to be tools of political patronage.  
 
5.1.2 Contemporary forest governance 
Forest governance in Kenya is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Environment and 
Forestry (MEF). This Ministry was established under the Executive Order No. 1 of 2018 (MEF, 
n.d.). The MEF have changed names under the different Kenyan administrations, however it 
holds many of the same responsibilities except that of Mining and Irrigation (Kenyans.co.ke, 
n.d.). At the time when Kenya submitted its R-PP in 2010, it was not one Kenyan Ministry 
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responsible for forest. There was the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources 
(ME&MR), the Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife and the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. 
After 2018, the Ministry of Environment and Forests have the responsibility for these functions: 
 
• National Environment Policy and Management,  
• Forestry development policy and management,  
• Development of re-afforestation and agro-forestry,  
• Restoration of strategic water towers,  
• Protection and conservation of Natural environment, 
• Pollution control, Lake Victoria management programme,  
• Restoration of Lake Naivasha basin, 
• Kenya Meteorological department,  
• Kenya meteorological training,  
• Conservation and protection of wetlands  
• Climate change affairs2 
(Republic of Kenya, 2018, p. 57-58) 
 
On the Ministry’s homepage it is written that their mission is ““To promote and facilitate good 
governance in the protection, restoration, conservation, development and management of 
environment and forestry resources for equitable and sustainable development’’ (MEF, n.d., 
para. 4). It also states that it is committed to mitigating the effects of climate change (ibid, para. 
2). Under the MEF there are several institutions: 
- National Environnemental Management Authority (NEMA) 
- Kenya Forest Service (KFS) 
- Kenya Forestry Research Institute (KFRI) 
- Kenya Water Tower Agency (KWTA) 
- Directorate of Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing (DRSRS) 
 
2 This list is taken from the Executive Order No 1 (Republic of Kenya, 2018),. The list can also 
be found on the MEF homepage under http://www.environment.go.ke/?page_id=6250  
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- National Environment Trust Fund (NETF) 
- Kenya Meteorological Training College 
- National Climate Change Council 
 
Forests in Kenya were managed by the Forest Department up till the Foret Act of 2005. The 
Forest Department was rebranded and reorganized into the Kenya Forest Service under this 
Act. According to  Standing and Gachanja (2014) the dismantlement of the Forest Department 
was a result of several factors, one of them being loss of public credibility. The KFS became 
the new operational forest manager in Kenya and it started up operation in 2007 (KFS, 2020). 
 
5.1.3 REDD+ policy and readiness process in Kenya 
REDD+ readiness is first and foremost a programme developed between the state and 
international organisations and institutions. The essence is that a country develops a policy that 
fits into an international framework (UNFCCC) making it possible to receive payment for 
carbon sequestration.  This is important to consider, because many of the activities and 
requirements for achieving a REDD readiness package is determined by global frameworks.  
 
The Government of Kenya embarked on a process of REDD readiness with support from the 
FCPF and the UN-REDD (Bernard et al., 2014). In 2008, the Kenyan Ministry of Environment 
and Mineral Resources sent a request for participation in the World Bank’s Carbon Finance 
Partnership Facility on the behalf of the Government of Kenya. This request includes the 
Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN) which is an initial plan for how Kenya shall frame and 
implement its REDD policy. This lead to an grant agreement between the The Republic of 
Kenya and the World Bank under the FCPF as Kenya was selected as a REDD Country 
Participant (World bank, 2009). This grant,  was allocated to contribute to Kenya’s work 
towards the formulation of a Readiness Plan (World bank, 2009). This REDD readiness 
preparation proposal was first submitted to the FCPF in June 2010 (KFS, 2010a). It was then 
reviewed by Julius Wambugu Kamau in June 2010, the assessment from this review was taken 
into account and GoK submitted a revised REDD readiness preparation proposal in October 
2010 (KFS, 2010b; Wambugu Kamau, 2010). The agency responsible for the creation and 
formulation of these proposals was Kenya Forest Service (KFS).  
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5.2 The Mau Forest Complex 
Since the British controlled Kenya under colonial rule (1895-1963), the forest has been the 
scene of power plays, resource extraction, and regional struggles (Klopp & Sang, 2011). Today 
the forest face degradation and deforestation, affecting livelihoods, water-flow regulation, soil 
erosion and siltation, tea production, tourism and energy production (Albertazzi et al., 2018; 
Republic of Kenya, 2009; UNEP, 2009). To confront the ecological destabilizing effect the 
deforestation of the Mau Complex has, the government of Kenya has initiated a forest 
conservation project which is a part of the countries REDD+ plan (Republic of Kenya, 2009; 
Republic of Kenya, 2010). 
 
The restoration of the Mau Forest complex does in addition play an important role in Kenya’s 
Development agenda the Vision 2030: 
 
“Vision 2030: the country’s economic blueprint, through its support to the 
other primary sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture, tourism and 
energy. Under Vision 2030, Kenya aims to protect the five water towers (Mt. 
Kenya, Aberdares, Mau, Cherangani and Mt. Elgon) and increase the forest 
cover to 10% through an aggressive afforestation and reforestation and 
restoration programme. The proposed REDD strategy will greatly support 
these efforts through improved forest sector governance that will promote 
sustainable management and conservation of the five key forest 
ecosystems.”  (KFS, 2010b, p. 34) 
In this section, the ecological importance of the Mau forest is established,  before going into 
the conservation project. The last section is about the contemporary situation in the forest. This 
includes media reports on evictions and human rights violations.  
5.2.1 Ecological importance 
There are five water towers that serves as upper catchment areas for Kenya’s major rivers. The 
largest of these montane forests is the Mau Forest Complex which consists of 16 contiguous 
forest blocks and 6 satellite forest blocks that stretches over 400 000 hectares (UNEP, 2009). 
The Mau Forest Complex is located about 170km north-west of Nairobi in the Kenyan Rift 
Valley Province (Waitagei, 2017; WWF, 2004). According to UNEP , the Mau Complex is a 
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water catchment area serving western Kenya and the rift wally. In addition it is also a vital part 
of the Kenyan economy contributing to sectors like “… energy, tourism, agriculture, and water 
supplies for settlements” (2009 p. 8).  
 
However, the forest is not only important within Kenya’s boarders.  In addition to serving as 
the upper catchment for national rivers and lakes the forest provides water for transboundary 
lakes such as Lake Victoria3, Lake Turkana, and Lake Natron. Furthermore, national parks and 
game reserves are dependent on the Mau Complex through the Mara River. This river flows 
through both the Maasai Mara and the Serengeti, areas that according to WWF (2019) 
“supports some of the most profitable economic activities in Kenya and Tanzania, including 
tourism, agriculture and mining, which collectively contribute between 10-15% to both 
countries’ GDP” (para. 3).  
 
5.2.2 Mau Forest Complex conservation efforts 
Despite the fact that the Mau Complex serves an important role for water-flow regulation, flood 
mitigation, tea production, energy production, micro-climate regulation and more, the forest 
has gone through extensive degradation (Albertazzi et al., 2018; Republic of Kenya, 2009; 
UNEP, 2009). According to the The New Humanitarian (2009), a land area of 107.000ha of 
forest have been destroyed since the 1990s. 
 
After an aerial reconnaissance attended by representatives from UNEP, the ME&MR, and the 
Kenyan Wildlife Service amongst others, a report on declining forest cover was produced. The 
report includes recommendations to the Kenyan Government “… to re-establish law and order 
in the protected forests and restore critical catchments to address current environmental and 
economic threats.” (GoK & UNEP, 2008, p. 4).  
 
As a response to this deforestation of the largest closed-canopy forest in Kenya, the Office of 
the Prime Minister initiated a conference which was held on the 15th of July 2008 in Nairobi 
(Republic of Kenya, 2009). This consultative forum was attended by three hundred 
stakeholders, ranging from the Prime Minister himself, to community-based organization, and 
international organisations. As a result, The Task Force on the Conservation of the Mau Forest 
 
3 Lake Victoria is one of the great sources to the Nile river system (M. El-Kammash & Gordon 
Smith, 2019). The basin of the river Nile runs through 10 countries (ibid). 
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Complex was established by the Prime Minister on the 22nd of July 2008. The purpose of this 
Task Force was to develop recommendations to the Government of Kenya on: 
 
“(i) Effective management structure to stop any further degradation in the 
Mau Forests Complex;  
(ii) Long-term solution for uncontrolled human settlement in and around the 
forest complex, including relocation of populations as may be necessary for 
the conservation of the forest complex;  
(iii) The restoration of all degraded forests and critical water catchments in 
the Mau Complex; and,  
(iv) Mobilizing resources to achieve the above mentioned objectives. “ 
(Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 7) 
 
The work of the Task Force resulted in the Report of the Prime Minister’s Task Force on the 
Conservation of the Mau Forest Complex (2009). In this report The Task Force substantiate 
the ecological and economical importance of the forest as well as their recommendation on 
how to restore and reforest the Mau Forest. The project was sponsored by USAID and the 
technical supported came from UNEP (Republic of Kenya, 2009). The report and its 
recommendations were approved by both the Cabinet and the Parliament by the 15th of 
September 2009 (Interim Coordinating Secretariat, 2009). Further, to coordinate the activities 
and implement the recommendations set by the Mau Task Force, the Interim Coordinating 
Secretariat (ICS) was founded. This was done by the Office of the Prime Minister 4th of 
September 2009 (Interim Coordinating Secretariat, 2009). The ICS put forth the “Brief on the 
Rehabilitation of the Mau Forest Complex”  the same year where they represent a five phase 
plan to restore and reforest the Mau Forest Complex (Interim Coordinating Secretariat, 2009) 
 
5.2.3 The Mau forest complex today 
In both reports, by the Task Force and the ICS, it is clear that the Mau Forest Complex 
conservation is essential to Kenya’s sustainable development goals and the Kenya Vision 2030 
and the Kenyan REDD+ project. Sustainable management of the forest is also emphasised in 
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both reports as one of the main conservation goals (Interim Coordinating Secretariat, 2009; 
Republic of Kenya, 2009).  
 
The first and second phase of the restoration plan were reported “almost complete” in 2010 
(Interim Coordinating Secretariat, 2010b, p. 4). The first phase included repossession of 
unoccupied land excised in 2001, while the second phase encompassed the repossession of land 
that was illegally occupied by squatters (Interim Coordinating Secretariat, 2010b, p. 4). In a 
news release by the ICS (2010a) declared that they were ready to begin implementing the third 
phase. The main activities in the third phase of the conservation process included marking of 
boundaries, recovery of titled forest land in the Maasai Mau trust land forest, and analysis of 
ownership (Interim Coordinating Secretariat, 2010a). 
 
To this date, I have not been able to obtain any press releases or official documents on the 
progress of the Mau Forest Complex restoration between 2013 and 2020. Nonetheless, there 
are reports made by various media outlets and organisations. Human Rights Watch (2019) 
reported that violent evictions of people from the forest. In one incident in July 2018 nine 
people, two of which were babies, lost their lives in the eviction process (Human Rights Watch, 
2019). In 2020, the organisation published another article in which they ask the Kenyan 
government to investigate excessive use of force. The article reads: 
“Human Rights Watch found that between August and November 2019, a 
combined team of 150 officers from Kenya Wildlife Service, Kenya Forest 
Service, Administration Police, regular police, and Narok county rangers 
used excessive force to evict people from 10 villages in the eastern side of 
the forest land, including Kitoben, Olaba, Kapkoros, and Kirobon. Witnesses 
and family members said at least seven people died during or after the 
evictions. Kenyan authorities have not investigated these deaths and other 
abuses and have instead threatened to forcibly shut down the camps.” 
(Human Rights Watch, 2020, para. 5) 
This is happening in contrast to the policies and recommendations made by the Task Force, the 
interim coordination secretariat and several other reports made by Government of Kenya in 
collaboration with a range of actors like UNEP, USAID, the EU, The Government of Norway, 
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USGS, UNDP, UN-REDD programme, and several others (See: FAO & KFS, 2017; Interim 
Coordinating Secretariat, 2010b; Republic of Kenya, 2009; UNEP, 2009). 
 
Additionally, media reports on the human aspects of the conservation efforts contradicts basic 
human rights, the actions taken in the name of conservation have robbed people of their 
livelihoods, homes and even their life (EU, 2018; Human Rights Watch, 2020; Matara, 2020; 
Sayagie, 2019). Moreover, both the Prime Minister’s Task Force on the Conservation of the 
Mau Forest Complex (2009) and the Interim Coordinating Secretariat (2009) write in their 
reports that the conservation efforts seeks to achieve sustainable management of the forest. 
Sustainable management that can provide local population with alternative income sources 
derived from “ecosystem services” by being involved in the afforestation and reforestation of 




6. Findings and discussion: REDD+ policy on the 
national level 
In this chapter, I present the findings derived from the content analysis of the REDD+ readiness 
policy. The documents that was used for the analysis was the R-PIN and the R-PP. Further, I 
discuss these findings in light of the theoretical framework and findings presented in the case. 
This section addresses the findings in thematical order. These themes;  
• Forest governance structures,  
• Local communities, indigenous people and forest governance, 
• Property rights, ownership and commodification of forests,  
• Benefit-sharing and resource access  
In the end the findings and discussion are summarized under the heading; Accumulation by 
dispossession and benefit-sharing.  
 
Before going into the different themes, it is necessary to talk about the documents themselves. 
The R-PIN was submitted to the World Bank in 2008 by the Ministry of Environment and 
Mineral Resources on the behalf of the Government of Kenya. This government was at that 
time the entity in Kenya “charged with the responsibility of coordinating all environmental 
management issues including climate change,” (Ministry of Environment & Mineral 
Resources, 2008, front page, para. 3). The R-PIN consists of first a letter from the Permanent 
Secretary, then a filled in template provided by the FCPF. The content is written by several 
authors and contributors which represent different stakeholders in the Kenyan Forest Sector. 
These are: 
- Four forestry specialists; Alfred N. Gichu, Anthony M. Maina, Patrick Kariuki, and E. 
O. Omallo from the Kenya Forest Service. 
- Hewson Kabugi forest specialist and the deputy director Dr. Kasiki of Biodiversity, 
Research and Monitoring from the Kenyan Wildlife Service. 
- Charles Situma from the Directorate of Resource Surveys and Remote Sensing  
- William Omondi from the Kenya Forestry Research Institute (KEFRI) 
- D. R Mainki from the World Wildlife Funds The Eastern African Regional Programme 
Office (WWF- EARPO) 
 55 
- Enock Kanyanya from Nature Kenya  
(Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 2) 
Most of the authors comes from institutions which is under the ME&MR, the exceptions 
represent NGOs.  
 
The Revised REDD readiness preparation proposal was submitted to the FCPF in August 2010. 
This was sent in by the KFS, which was the REDD+ focal point in Kenya. The List of authors 
and contributors of the R-PP is too long to list here4. There where 51 authors and contributors 
11 was from the KFS, and 29 (including KFS) are of the total are from Kenyan ministries as 
well as institutions and agencies under the Kenyan government and state. The rest are people 
representing International organisations like the FAO and Non-governmental organisations 
like the Clinton Climate Initiative and the World Wildlife Fond. 
 
The documents chosen for this analysis is not per se official policies. The REDD+ readiness 
program in Kenya is designed in these documents and the outcome is supposed to be a formal 
REDD+ policy. However, as this policy does not yet exist, these documents are the closes thing 
to an official REDD+ policy as they form the framework and guidelines for how the work 
towards REDD+ readiness and implementation is conducted. This has several implications. 
One is that the readiness program is designed to be flexible, another is that it gives room for a 
feedback process where changes can be implemented, and new knowledge derived from pilot 
projects can be included in the later policies and actions.  
 
In the upcoming sections I will present findings from the REDD+ policy documents (R-PIN 
and R-PP) related to the research questions. One of the benefits of including both the R-PIN 
and the R-PP5  in this analysis is that the R-PIN account for the major pre-REDD forest 
governance structures. Consequently, the R-PP proposed changes will easier to identify. The 
two documents are discussed in relation to the literature, the case, and the theoretical 
framework. The focus of this section is to look at how different actors are included; who are 
empowered? Who are restricted? Are certain actors gaining control over land areas while others 
 
4 For full list see KFS, 2010b, p. iii-iv 
5  To avoid any confusion, it is necessary to emphasise which reference refers to which 
document.  
The R-PIN has the belonging reference: Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources (2008) 
The R-PP has the belonging reference KFS (2010b) 
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are losing it? What does the policies say about access to forest resources? Another important 
aspect of this section is to illuminate how the framework for benefit-sharing is formulated in 
the policies.  
 
6.1 Forest governance structures 
A good place to start is to present what actors are central to forest governance. Pre-REDD, the 
KFS were in charge of both forest monitoring and forests inventories, forestry and 
conservation, as well as serving a central role in forest law enforcement  (Ministry of 
Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 2-4). They were also the acting agency in charge 
of developing a national forest baseline and capacity building for establishing a framework to 
monitor carbon stock changes (p.2). The KFS is also one of several actors central to the 
coordination between forestry, agriculture sectors and rural development. 
 
These for categories are established by the FCPF through the template under “2. Which 
institutions are responsible in your country for:” (Ministry of Environment & Mineral 
Resources, 2008). KFS is central to all of them, but there are several other actors that serve 
important roles. Under forest monitoring and forest inventories Nature Kenya is supporting the 
KFS to develop a forest threat analysis (Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008). 
Nature Kenya is according to their homepage a nature society that works to promote “The study 
and conservation of nature in Eastern Africa”, they emphasise biodiversity conservation 
(Nature Kenya, n.d., para. 1). Another actor involved is the government agency Department of 
Resource Survey and Remote Sensing (DRSRS). DRSRS work with technical tools to monitor 
vegetation. KWS is also a government agency involved, working with protected areas focusing 
on “habitat change and wildlife monitoring” (Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 
2008). The other actors involved are The Regional Centre for Mapping of Resources for 
Development (RCMRD) with support from the UN Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA), The World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF), UNEP, and the WWF.  
 
Under forest law enforcement the KFS has the overall responsibility under the Forest Act 2005. 
There are seven government institutions with responsibilities in addition to the KFS. These are 
National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA), KWS, the Ministry of Land, Office 
of the Attorney General, Local Authorities, Commissioner of Police, Ministry of Water 
(Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 3). That the state, through these 
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institutions, is in charge of law enforcement is only natural and logical since this is one of the 
major functions of a state. However, there is one aspect of this category which is somewhat 
surprising. According to the R-PIN there are several civil society organizations (CSO)  “… that 
play an important role in forest law enforcement …” (Ministry of Environment & Mineral 
Resources, 2008, p. 3). When reading more closely, it becomes clear that these organizations’ 
involvement in law enforcement has been through exposing forest governance issues: 
 
Q1) “NGOs such as the Green Belt Movement (GBM), the Kenya Forest Working Group 
(KFWG), and the Forest Action Network (FAN) have been playing critical roles in bringing 
issues relating to forests to the attention of the public and holding the government accountable 
on these issues. For example, their role in lobbying against the 2001 excisions was vital in 
exposing mismanagement and bad practice.”(Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 
2008, p. 3) 
 
And advocating for better practices such as community involvement and Participatory Forest 
Management: 
Q2) “The Green Belt Movement has been at the center of national debate on forest issues. The 
Kenya Forest Working Group (KFWG) and the Forest Action Network (FAN) played an 
important role in the national forest policy and institutional reform process, and have been 
strong advocates of Participatory Forest Management (PFM) and forest law enforcement and 
governance, including the thorough studies, assessments and community mobilization for the 
establishment of forestry associations for forest blocks threatened by bad governance or 
inadequate law enforcement.” (Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 3) 
 
The R-PIN also states that civil society organisations will continue to serve this role in the 
future: 
Q3) The advocacy role will continue to be vital and will largely remain in the hands of the civil 
society organizations. Their role in PFM, and the incentives provided for in the Forest Act 
(2005) will motivate them to be more aggressive in promoting forest protection and sustainable 
forest management. However, in view of their own interest, there will be need to hold them 
accountable in order to ensure they are advocating for the public good. (Ministry of 
Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 3-4) 
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The last part of this sentence is of interest. It communicates a wish to monitor the civil society 
organisations role in PMF and “hold them accountable”, without stating how this shall be done. 
Further, as the two earlier quotations state, the role of the CSO is to enlighten issues related to 
forest governance. One interpretation is that it is desirable that CSOs take the responsibility to 
act as the forest governance watch dog at the same time as “someone” watch them to make 
sure they work for “the public good”. And this “someone”, the actor in charge of holding CSOs 
accountable, is not defined or formalized. Generally, the role of civil society in a state is to 
expose and enlighten issues with state governance. This is a vital part of both democracy and 
statesmanship; hence it is positive to include organization representing the civil society.  
 
The two las categories, forestry and forest conservation and coordination across forests and 
agriculture sectors, and rural development, the central actors responsible are all state actors 
and Universities. There are no institutions, organisations, or agencies that directly represent 
indigenous peoples. On the other hand Community Forest Associations (CFA) are included 
under coordination across forest and agricultural sectors, and rural development, it is however 
not clear what role these community associations will play or what they are responsible for 
(Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 4).  
 
The R-PP establishes the set of governance structures related to the Kenyan REDD program 
and how this fit in with existing forest management structures. To meet international standards 
set under the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord in addition to its responsibilities as 
a REDD participant under the World Bank’s Carbon Finance Partnership Facility, Kenya 
launched a National Climate Change Response Strategy (NCCRS). The goal with this strategy 
was “… to allow for coordinated efforts to address challenges of climate change in the country” 
(KFS, 2010b, p. 8). On the national level the Ministry of Environment and Mineral Resources 
is responsible for climate change coordination activities. To do this, the ME&MR created a 
Climate Change Secretariat which is informed by the Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Action 
(NEMA). The R-PP states that: 
Q4)“The Climate Change Secretariat will be backed by appropriate climate change policies 
and laws and have powers to enforce new laws and regulations relating to climate change. The 
policy, legal and institutional arrangements underpinning REDD+ strategies and measures to 
be implemented will be designed within the institutional framework proposed by the 
NCCRS.”(KFS, 2010b, p. 8).  
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From the language used in this quotation, it seems that these laws, regulations, and policies are 
not yet established, but that they will be. This is also evident in the findings from the R-PIN, 
which are presented further down in this section. Further, the forest governing structure under 
the REDD programme is not established. This is only natural as the purpose with R-PP is to 
establish this governing structure. The question then becomes what will come first? Will laws 
and regulation be set up as first and provide a framework for how REDD and other forestry 
activities will be conducted? Or will the agencies that conduct forestry and REDD activities 
and implementation come first for so to set up a legal and regulatory framework? According 
to the R-PP and the activity timeline provided (KFS, 2010b, see p. 79-82), the formulation of 
a legal and regulatory framework will happen after the establishment of governing agency. 
Further, the creation of this framework is to be one of the results from the REDD readiness 
process and activities.  
 
The main agency responsible for the coordination of REDD+ readiness activities (KFS, 2010b, 
p. 7). To carry out this mandate the KFS have created a secretariat that is made up by personnel 
from their own management programmes  (KFS, 2010b). The KFS will also be dealing with 
the everyday REDD tasks through their own Climate Change Response Programme. The R-PP 
has suggested a four-level governing structure for the REDD programme. On top is the 
National REDD+ Steering Committee, which memberships is “composed of Permanent 
Secretaries from the Ministries of Forestry and Wildlife, Environment and Mineral Resources, 
Energy, Local Government, Planning, Finance, the Directors of KFS, KEFRI and NEMA, 
IUCN,WWF , KFWG, a representative from Universities, UNDP/UNEP and the Donor 
Coordination Group.” (KFS, 2010b, p. 10). Under the National REDD+ Steering Committee is 
the REDD+ Technical Working Group (TWG). The TWG has an advisory role and report to 
the Steering Committee in addition to working with the National REDD+ Coordination Office. 
The TWG: 
Q5)”will consist of the most well placed individuals in Kenya to help define what strategy 
actions to move forward with during the R-PP early action and 11 testing step, and as the final 
REDD+ National Strategy is defined. … Members will have expertise in forestry, finance, land 
use, agriculture, wildlife management, range management, and timber production and the 
management of private sector enterprises. “In addition, there will be one representative from 
CSOs, one representative from community forest associations, one representative from water 
resource users groups, one representative from indigenous communities living in forests.”” 
(KFS, 2010b, p. 10-11) 
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On the next level, under the TWG, is the National REDD+ Coordination Office. This Office 
main task is to operationalize the R-PP (KFS, 2010b).  The Office will be comprised of 15 full 
time workers. In addition, this office will coordinate with Local Conservancy REDD+ Officers. 
There will be one officer per conservancy6 . These local officers will coordinate regional 
activities and work with the REDD+ Component Task Forces. 
 
According to the R-PIN and the R-PP weak or poor governance is one of the main drivers of 
deforestation in Kenya. This is also reflected in the presentation of forest governance in Kenya 
under the case chapter  5.1. The R-PIN points out institutional failures as one of eleven major 
causes of deforestation: 
Q6)  “Institutional failures arising from: 
 Weak governance structures 
 Inadequate capacity to enforce the law 
 Inadequate forest management plans  
 Lack of real community participation in forest management” 
(Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 6-7) 
 
The proposed solution according to the document is to fully implement the Forest Act 2005: 
Q7) The key issue for the forestry sector in Kenya is to implement the Forest Act 2005 in a 
transparent process & involving concerned stakeholders at all levels of decision making. 
Respective key issues are listed below: 
- Increasing public awareness about the provisions of the Forest Act 2005. 
- Developing KFS capacity at headquarter and field level 
- Involving the private sector and communities in forest management based on a) 
concessions, license and community forest management agreements, b) management 
plans and c) implementation monitoring …” 
(Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 8) 
 
Further the R-PIN explains how to overcome institutional challenges when implementing 
REDD strategies: 
 
6 Kenya is divided into 10 different ecological boundaries forming 10 conservancies. For overview see R-PP, KFS 
2010b, p. 1-2. 
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- Q8) Strengthening community participation through effectively attaining to and putting 
into practice the Forest Act 2005, which essentially has addressed the concept of 
participatory forest management. This represents a radical departure from previous 
practices, where the government assumed full management responsibilities in gazetted 
forest reserves by giving a considerable weight to community participation in the form 
of CFAs. 
- Strengthening the KFS, evolving from being an enforcement agency to one that 
facilitates sustainable forest resource use and greater investment 
(Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 14) 
 
From this it is evident that Kenya has taken steps to address the issues of weak or poor 
governance. There is also an emphasis on participatory forest management and the inclusion 
of community forest associations. They also recognize the problem of inadequate community 
participation in forest conservation. The actor with main responsible for overcoming these 
issues is the KFS through the implementation of the Forest Act 2005. The Forest Act 2005 has 
in addition “… [provided] the legal basis for the private sector, joint forest management and 
community participation in forestry.” (Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, 
p. 7). Nevertheless, at the time when the R-PIN was written a legal framework for how this 
would be managed, especially on trust-land, was still absent (Ministry of Environment & 
Mineral Resources, 2008). 
 
6.2 Local communities, indigenous people and forest governance 
The findings presented above indicates that the governance structure accounted for in the R-
PIN does include forest communities through participatory forest management and Community 
Associations. A document search shows that the words community/communities is mentioned 
57 times, participation/participatory 19 times and indigenous 12 times in the R-PIN. While in 
the R-PP community/communities is mentioned 99 times, participation/participatory 65 times 
and indigenous 22 times. Looking at these key words gives an indication not only how they are 
involved but also what role communities and indigenous people play in forest governance 
under the proposed REDD+ framework.  
 
First of all, it is clear that the formal framework for the inclusion of local communities is set 
by the Forest Act 2005. Nevertheless, the words used to describe this how this inclusion will 
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be established are vague. One example is that The Forest Act 2005 provides incentives for 
PFM that will motivate CSOs and to be more aggressive in promoting forest protection (See 
Q3). Two other examples are that the Act is “…opening up forest management to private sector 
and communities” and that “…forest dwellers are encouraged to form Community Forest 
Associations” through the Forest act (Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 
9, 13, added emphasis). Further, the R-PIN states that “The proposed REDD program will be 
implemented within the framework of the forest act 2005 that seeks to entrench community 
participation in forest management.” (Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 
9).  
 
This gives the impression that the REDD program and the Forest Act 2005 does not formally 
require community participation. Rather these policies are seeking to, opening up for, and 
encouraging to include communities. While state actors like the KFS are given mandates with 
real responsibilities, it is not formally established that communities shall or will be included or 
how this will be done. This can have further implications, as mentioned above, there is no legal 
framework for managing community participation. 
 
The same trend can be found when looking at the key word indigenous. First of all, the R-PIN 
establishes that there is a lack of quantitative data on indigenous communities in Kenya. In the 
short descriptions provided of these communities it is set forth that “payment for ecoservices 
… can be a very useful instrument to empower indigenous communities to manage their 
resources in a sustainable way, protect indigenous land and user rights…” (Ministry of 
Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 8, added emphasis). It is not stating that PES shall 
be distributed to indigenous communities through the implementation of REDD+, or that the 
REDD program will protect indigenous land and user rights. 
 
 These indications and descriptions of how communities, forest dwellers, and indigenous 
people will be included are troublesome. Because they leave an impression that the REDD 
program in Kenya takes steps to include different communities without actually establishing a 
binding framework. The R-PIN (and R-PP) provides the impression that communities and 
community participation play an important role at the same time as it is not clear what or who 
has responsibility for making sure this happens. In addition, there is no legal framework to 
establish this relationship between communities and forest governance. 
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In the R-PP local communities are included in a more tangible way. One example of this is that 
they will be included in the TWG (see Q5). Further, the Conservancy Officers will also, work 
closely with local communities and civil society: 
Q9) “Conservancy Officers therefore coordinate with local committees that include civil 
society and other local community actors who take part in the implementation of the 
activities and take part in evaluations as described by component 6. … Local REDD+ 
conservancy officers will liaise with local representatives from agriculture, land, water, 
wildlife, community forest associations, CSOs, timber industry as defined by REDD+ 
Component task force needs.” (KFS, 2010b, p. 12) 
 
Communities and indigenous people were also included in the R-PP formulation process 
through regional workshops. Information about the REDD+ readiness program and the R-PP 
formulation was distributed from KFS, in the form of an informative brochure, to the different 
conservancies. Additional information was to be found on the KFS webpage. The 10 
conservancies did not have their own regional workshops, but they were compressed into four 
different regional blocks (KFS, 2010b, p. 16). 
 
There are however three problems with this approach. First is the issues with information. 
Information given to forest dependent communities and indigenous people was written by KFS, 
which is an agency that has invested time, resources and funding on the REDD+ project. They 
have also been given a central role in the REDD+ readiness program. This might affect the 
information they choose to give out, how they choose to frame the project etc. In addition, the 
KFS brochure might be the only accessible information to communities and indigenous 
peoples. Internet connection and devises that is needed to connect is not available to everyone 
in Kenya7.  The second problem is about access to the workshops. It is not clarified in the R-
PP how forest dependent communities from all over Kenya had access to transport to the four 
regional workshops. Some probably had to travel over great distances to attend using time and 
spending money. This might not be an option for everyone.  
 
The third problem is related to the role these workshops serve. The workshops were created as 
consultative forums where communities could come with inputs to the formulation of the R-
 
7 Internet penetration in Kenya has risen in the last couple of years and is as of today at 90%, however this is after 
a rise of 14.3% in 2017  (Fredrick, 2019). This was 7 years after the R-PP was submitted to the FCPF. 
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PP. There is no elaboration of these inputs, only a few observations like “Forest dependent 
communities want to be assured that REDD+ will not place a burden on them, such as by 
depriving them of their lands and access to forest and forest products.” and “Stakeholders want 
to know how REDD+ will improve their lives and how any revenues that might result from 
REDD+ will be distributed.” (KFS, 2010b, p. 18). The R-PP does also account for the “key 
issues” that resulted from the workshop consultation. These where:  
Q10) “… land rights, ownership of carbon stocks, REDD+ and rural poverty, indigenous 
knowledge and protection of intellectual property rights on conservation, REDD+ and social 
considerations.” (KFS, 2010b, p. 19). 
 
6.3 Property rights, ownership and commodification of forest 
resources 
As discussed in the case, the problem of corruption in the forest sector has led to allocation of 
forests through settlement schemes. One consequence of this has been high inequality when it 
comes to land ownership. Another has been a huge loss of forest land especially in the Mau 
Forest Complex (Standing & Gachanja, 2014). Lastly, ownership and property rights might be 
highly contested and a source of conflict.  
 
Arguably there has already been a process of accumulation by dispossession. This is further 
discussed in the next chapter. What is of interest in this section is to present how, or if, the R-
PIN and R-PP establishes a framework for property rights and ownership. This ultimately has 
consequences for who receives benefits from the commodification of forest through carbon 
credits and/or payments for ecosystems services. As presented in the previous chapter, the 
Forest Act 2005 has opened up for communities and private sector to be involved in forest 
management. more 
 
In the R-PIN a statistic overview of forest ownership is given: “Most of the forests (97.8%) are 
either state owned or managed by local authorities, only 2.3% private forests exist. The 
woodlands are mainly on trust-land, held in trust for residents by local authorities until 
formalization of rights.” (Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 5) 
 
In relation to tenure and ownership the R-PP states:  
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Q11) “Tenure and ownership of forests KFS owns and manages all State Forest Reserves, but 
under the new Act it also has regulatory functions relating to all other public and private 
forests. These regulatory functions are aimed at ensuring forests receive appropriate 
protection and are managed sustainably through management plans.  
 
Trees on private farms are not subject to state regulation. Private forests consisting mainly of 
commercial plantations, and fuel wood plantations owned by tea estates, are not subject to 
KFS interference except in cases of destruction or mismanagement, in which case they can be 
declared provisional forests and are temporarily brought under the jurisdiction of KFS. Local 
Authority forests on trust lands are not regulated by the KFS unless requested to do so by the 
Local Authority.”(KFS, 2010b, p. 27) 
 
Looking at this, it is clear that under this new arrangement the KFS have received a central and 
powerful role in forest regulation. This is backed up by the findings presented further up, where 
the KFS has responsibility for law enforcement in addition to the “regulatory functions” related 
to public and private forests. 
 
Under drivers of deforestation and forest degradation there are several indirect governance 
drivers that are listed relevant to ownership: 
Q12) 
• “Poor governance, including weak institutions, corruption, illegal logging, weak law 
enforcement. 
• Weak community participation in forest management 
• Inadequate benefit sharing from forest resources (including revenue sharing) 
• Local authorities do not value their forests 
• Communal land systems - lack of private ownership of the resources/land 
• Unclear tenure and access to forest resources (e.g. Local Authority forests)” 
(KFS, 2010b, p. 29, added emphasis) 
 
The impressions taken from this quote is that the lack of private ownership is a problem leading 
to deforestation and that communal land systems thus are contributing to environmental 
degradation. Consequently, the R-PP communicates that private ownership is advantageous to 
communal land systems. Further, under the heading Economic benefits, the R-PIN states that 
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these will “accrue to resource owners, investors, industries and consumers” (Ministry of 
Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 17) . Communities and indigenous peoples are 
not mentioned in relation to these economic benefits. In addition, the R-PIN states: 
Q13) “In the framework of a national REDD project, other Payments for Environmental 
Services will be piloted. The project will closely collaborate with the current WB project 
exploring water environmental services in a pilot area. Experiences from the Costa Rica 
Payments for Environmental Services Program (PESP) will be reviewed and opportunities to 
develop a respective Fund to reward land owners for providing respective services will be 
explored.” (Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 19, added emphasis). 
  
Regarding these three aspects, it seems that the R-PIN and the R-PP are opening up for resource 
owners, investors, industries, landowners to gain economic advantages from REDD. At the 
same time as indicating a preference towards private ownership. This signifies an opening for 
accumulation by dispossession by starting a process where REDD becomes source of new 
income and investment opportunities by commodifying forests. And this is to the benefit of 
more powerful actors like industries and landowners. However, it is important to point out that 
this is just an opening. It does not mean that communities automatically will lose access to 
forest resources to the benefit of powerful actors, but it does mean that the stage is set for a 
process where this can become reality.  
 
This is an issue that is further affirmed by the fact that there is no legal framework for regulating 
rights to carbon benefits and carbon ownership nor is there any legal framework for 
establishing how Rights of Access under the Forest Act of 2005 will be integrated into REDD 
strategies (see KFS, 2010b, p. 50). A consequence of this might be that local communities and 
indigenous people become excluded and dispossessed to the economic benefit of actors private 
businesses, the KFS, and land owners, derived from the commodification of forest under the 
REDD program.  
 
6.4 Benefit-sharing and resource access 
In order to answer the research question, it is necessary to include how the framework set by 
the R-PIN and the R-PP establishes access to forest resources, benefit-sharing, and safeguards. 
As discussed above, indigenous people and forest dependent communities were not included 
under economic benefits in the R-PIN. They are however included under social benefits: 
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Q14) Social benefits will accrue to forest dwellers, forest adjacent communities, forest 
owners and the public through: 
• Legal access to the forest and well defined user rights that can be enforced 
• lncreased employment and improved livelihoods 
• Sustainable supply of forest products, including timber 
• Preservation of important cultural sites 
• Reduced soil erosion and higher agricultural productivity in nearby farm plots 
• lncreased ecotourism potential 
• Improved water quality, health and well-being 
(Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 17) 
 
Further the R-PIN suggest that: 
Q15) “Payment for environmental services in water catchment management can be a very 
useful instrument to empower indigenous communities to manage their resources in a 
sustainable way, protect indigenous land and user rights, contribute to poverty reduction, and 
provide long term benefits to the indigenous people. There are immense opportunities for 
employment creation, poverty alleviation, good governance and recognition of ancestral 
rights.” (Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 9, added emphasis) 
 
The R-PP makes a statement early on saying that: 
Q16:“All activities will be designed with a focus on co- benefits such as improving biodiversity 
and livelihoods of forest dependent peoples” (KFS, 2010b, p. 3, emphasis added).  
 
This is elaborated later when the R-PP accounts for the role of communities: 
Q17) The new policy and legislation introduces provision for empowerment of communities 
in forest management and more equitable sharing of benefits. This is a major departure from 
the past when communities had little or no role and access to subsistence resources in forests 
was often prohibited, resulting in conflicts between communities and forest authorities. The 
new provisions are aimed at improving livelihoods by increasing the benefits of forests and 
thereby reducing the pressures on forests. 
…  
Benefit sharing arrangements are being discussed between KFS and communities but are not 
finalized. The benefits include access to firewood and other resources in forests and 
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participation in taungya system planting in plantations. KFS has in some few cases offloaded 
all carbon rights to communities who have invested in management and conservation of 
specific forest blocks with climate change mitigation as an added benefit. Some communities 
expect that revenue for timber sales and payments for ecosystem services will be shared, but 
no agreement has been reached on this issue and it is not specifically covered in the new policy 
and law, and is a potential source of future conflict. (KFS, 2010b, p. 27, emphasis added) 
 
Indigenous peoples, specifically, is only mentioned in relation to benefits at one point in the R-
PIN (no mentions indigenous/benefit in the R-PP) : 
Q18)” The proposed REDD program will be implemented within the framework of the Forests 
Act 2005 that seeks to entrench community participation in forest management. Under such 
arrangements, indigenous peoples will benefit from their efforts in forest rehabilitation, 
afforestation, reforestation and conservation. The Government of Kenya recognizes that, given 
their close association with forests, wildlife, and other natural resources, any interventions 
should take cognizance of the potential impacts on identity, culture, and customary livelihoods 
of the indigenous communities.”  (Ministry of Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 9, 
added emphasis) 
 
What is evident from these extractions is that suggested framework for planning and 
implementing REDD in Kenya does focus on benefit sharing and empowerment of 
communities. Q14 illustrates that there will be social benefits for different community groups, 
which includes legal access to forest. But as discussed earlier, this legally founded access is 
not yet established in an existing legal framework. Benefits in form of improved livelihoods is 
mentioned in Q14- 17. There is however no mentioned of how livelihood improvements will 
take form, or under what regulations these improvements are guaranteed to local 
communities/forest dependent people/indigenous people. Further in Q18, it seems clear that 
indigenous people will benefit from afforestation and reforestation. However, this is under the 
specific condition: that the proposed REDD program is implemented within the framework of 
the forest act of 2005, an act that seeks to entrench community participation (Ministry of 
Environment & Mineral Resources, 2008, p. 9). This is also reflected upon in Q17, as it states 
that there is no existing agreement for sharing revenues. 
 
The framework set by the R-PIN and the R-PP gives the impression that the REDD program 
will focus on benefits, community participation and livelihood improvements. However, the 
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language is vague, and there is no explicit framework establishing how this will be done, 
specifically how livelihoods will be improved, or how benefits will be shared. There is no 
mention how conflicts can be mitigated just that there is possibilities for conflicts. In addition, 
there is very little mention of safeguards in the R-PP (no mentions in the R-PIN). These 
mentions are: 
 
Q19) Various existing national and project level standards can be considered when defining 
criteria to which authorities in Kenya can evaluate candidate actors. This includes applying 
safeguards to ensure that social (gender, IP, marginalized groups) and environmental impacts 
are minimized and mitigated, reflecting on wealth of ongoing international work in the field of 
safeguards. (KFS, 2010b, p. 48, emphasis added) 
 
Q20) The criteria and indicators for sustainable forest management (SFM) provide a backdrop 
and reference framework for refining the proposed strategies and developing specific project 
proposals with stakeholders. SFM criteria and indicators provide a comprehensive set of social 
and environment safeguards for planning and implementing forestry projects…As funding 
from FCPF is expected to support readiness activities, the proposed REDD+ preparedness 
activities will also be assessed for compliance with World Bank safeguard policies. (KFS, 
2010b, p. 53, emphasis added) 
 
Q21) Integration with safeguard measures (SESA): In order to prevent or control adverse 
impacts on stakeholders resulting from activities of REDD+ it will be necessary to put 
safeguard measures in place. The World Bank’s “Strategic Environmental & Social 
Assessment” (do no harm) SESA tool is outlined in Component 2d of the R-PP to assist in 
avoiding negative impacts and enhance additional REDD+ benefits. The consultation included 
in the SESA process should be integrated into the overall consultation process. (KFS, 2010b, 
p. 20, emphasis added) 
 
These mentions of safeguards establishes that the REDD program and policy will include 
safeguard measures. Which is very positive, having in mind the previous discussions. If these 
safeguards are effectively implemented negative outcomes in relation to communities and 
indigenous people might be avoided when implementing REDD+ projects.  
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7. Findings and Discussion: Conservation, afforestation 
and reforestation of the Mau Forest Complex 
In this chapter I present the findings from the Report of the Prime Minister’s Task Force on the 
Conservation of the Mau Forest Complex (Republic of Kenya, 2009). This document is from 
this point on referred to as ”The Report”, and the body that wrote it will be referred to as the 
“Task Force”. I discuss the findings derived from The Report in relation to the case and the 
theoretical framework. This chapter is structured identical to the previous.  
 
The Report written by a The task force was submitted to the government of Kenya in 2009. 
The task force which developed an wrote the conservation recommendation consisted of 
several members and a secretariat8. Of these, ten represented official government ministries 
and departments, nine representatives from communities, one was a representative from the 
Ogiek Peoples’ development Programme. In the secretariate was headed by the Policy and 
Programme Officer of UNEP Kenya, while the members of the secretariat was the director of 
KWS, the director KFS and the managing director of Ewaso Ngiro South Development 
Authority. There is no further information of how or why these different members where 
chosen. However, the inclusion of community representatives shows that a diverse set of local 
people where represented and had the opportunity to influence the policy-making process. 
Indicating that local communities where given some decision-making power in the 
conservation process: 
Q22) “The forum agreed to establish a multi‐stakeholder task force, comprising 
representatives from relevant Government institutions, non‐governmental organizations, 
affected communities and private sector. The Mau Task Force was officially launched by the 
Prime Minister on 22 July 2008.”(Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 19) 
 
On the other hand, the document does not account for how these community representatives 
where chosen or if there was any mechanism in place to make sure they acted in the interest of 
the communities.  
  
 
8 For full list see Republic of Kenya (2009), p. 4-5 
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7.1 Forest governance structures  
In the same way as the REDD readiness framework set by the R-PIN and the R-PP, the Report 
blames the degradation of the Mau Forest Complex on “inadequate governance” and “weak 
law enforcement” (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p.22, 9). Encroachment is listed as one of the 
other reasons.  
Q23)  “Although ill-planned settlements endorsed by the Government have 
been the main causes of the loss of forestland in the Mau Forests Complex, 
extensive encroachment have also taken place, leading to the destruction of 
some 29,000 hectares of indigenous forest; 
Encroachments have taken place not only in the southern forest blocks 
affected by excisions, but also in the northern blocks. Encroachment is 
affecting equally the forest reserves managed by Kenya Forest Service and 
the trust land forest managed by the Narok County Council;” (Republic of 
Kenya, 2009, p. 22) 
 
To deal with this the Task Force recommend several institutional arrangements. This includes: 
 
Q24) “Establishing the boundaries of a protected forest area is a prerequisite to its 
conservation and management. Forest boundaries that are well defined and demarcated on the 
ground reduce conflicts on forest resource use, help law enforcement and monitoring and 
enable active management of forests”. (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 29) 
As discussed in the case, mapping and drawing of boundaries has in the past been used as a 
tool to dispossess forest residents. Even though it is necessary to do this after the process of 
illegally allocation land under e.g. Moi, and to get an overview of forest resources belonging 
to the state, this process leaves the impression that the conservation efforts will be done in the 
name of “fortress conservation”. Further, to Gazette land for afforestation and reforestation, 
encroachers and other residents in the forest need to be relocated. This is discussed in detailed 
under section 7.3. 
 
The Report also recommends to strengthen the technical and financial capacity at the KFS to 
deal with financing challenges (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 11) 
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Q25)” The Mau Forests Complex Task Force established a joint enforcement force comprising 
182 rangers from Kenya Wildlife Service, Kenya Forest Service, Administration Police and 
Narok County Council to contain further forest destruction. The joint enforcement force 
succeeded in reducing the movement of illegally extracted forest resources by approx. 70 per 
cent. But there are challenges which include financing and command structure;” (Republic of 
Kenya, 2009, p. 10) 
 
The KFS and the KWS are two central actors in the conservation policy recommended by the 
Task force. This would not automatically be a problem, however, the KFS is a reorganised and 
rebranded version of the Forest Department. A Forest Department that needed rebranding 
because of its bad reputation and history of corruption. The Report does touch upon this when 
writing: 
 
Q26)” Although a new Forest Act was passed in 2005 and operationalized in February 2007, 
establishing the Kenya Forest Service, the essential reforms to transform the former Forest 
Department into a corporate entity with a transformed corporate culture remains slow and 
inadequate;” (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 9) 
   
At least the Task Force’s Report does acknowledge this fact, what is of concern is that the R-
PIN and the R-PP does not. This might indicate that this is information Kenya does not want 
to share with the World Bank and the FCPF.  In addition, there is a wish to strengthen law 
enforcement to secure forest values: 
 
Q27) “To secure the critical water catchments values and the biodiversity of the Mau Forests 
Complex, law enforcement must be strengthened. A fully effective force across the entire Mau 
Forests Complex will require additional financial resources and equipment” (Republic of 
Kenya, 2009, p. 15) 
 
These factors give an opening for appropriation of land. By establishing new boundaries there 
is an opportunity to delegitimize previous land ownerships, and the strengthening of law 
enforcement can be used to limit access to forest resources for local people.  
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7.2 Local communities, indigenous people and forest governance 
The task force has come out ahead of the REDD readiness documents by including local 
community representatives in the formation of the policy recommendation. The Report does 
also focus on sustainability in their recommendations: 
Q28) The accelerating destruction of the Mau Forests Complex has reached national 
emergency proportion prompting the Government through the Office of the Prime Minister to 
engage all the stakeholders, including all relevant Government Ministries, to provide a 
sustainable solution to the current crisis.  (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 9) 
 
Q29) The Government should provide the necessary financial resources to the Mau Forests 
Complex Authority for the sustainable management of the Mau Forests Complex. Similarly, 
the Narok County Council should provide adequate funding to the autonomous body contracted 
to manage the Maasai Mau trust land forest; (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 16) 
 
Sustainability/sustainable/sustainable is mentioned 26 times throughout the Report, and those 
mentions relates to management or sustainable ecosystems. The report also states that securing 
the Mau Forest Complex is vital to “…attain sustainable development in Kenya  (Republic of 
Kenya, 2009, p. 18). This communicates a which to govern the forest within the framework 
and principles of sustainability and sustainable development. The report does however not 
account for what sustainability is, or how it is defined. The report states: 
Q30)” Sustainable management of the forest will not be possible unless those who are residing 
in the protected forest, the critical water catchment areas and the biodiversity hotspots are 
relocated. Financial resources will be required for re‐settlement/compensation where 
appropriate;” (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 69) 
 
This gives a further opening for appropriation where sustainable management is given as the 
reason for relocation of people. This also indicates that the notion of sustainable management 
in the context of conservation, afforestation and reforestation of the Mau exclusively focus on 
sustainability of ecosystems and not considering human development poverty reduction. In 
contrast to this and the earlier observation of an indication towards “forest conservation” the 
Report reflects that” Securing boundaries cannot be achieved without the adequate 
participation of the surrounding communities;” (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 32). It also 
concludes that: 
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Q31) “Fencing is only appropriate if it is fully supported by the adjacent communities. This is 
usually the case when the fence provides benefits to the communities, often in terms of reduced 
human‐wildlife conflicts;” (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 32) 
 
These findings support the notion that the conservation, afforestation and reforestation of the 
Mau Forest Complex will include communities and take community concerns and needs into 
account. In line with these findings and in contrast with earlier findings, the Report also wishes 
to promote Community based law enforcements (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 10).  
Q32)A number of amendments should be made to existing laws, in particular to the Local 
Government Act (Cap. 265) and the Trust Land Act (Cap 288) to reflect the need for joint 
management, including local communities in the Maasai Mau trust land forest; (Republic of 
Kenya, 2009, p. 11) 
 
But how this will be done this is not further elaborated. Community/communities is mentioned 
72 times in the Report, while indigenous is mentioned 24, but all of these, with three 
exceptions, are in relation to “indigenous forests” not people. Despite this the Ogiek is 
mentioned 24 times.  
 
According to the recommendations there is need to include local communities in forest 
management: 
 
Q33) “Local communities should be involved in restoration activities in order to synergize 
traditional and scientific knowledge on sustainable forest management;” (Republic of Kenya, 
2009, p. 58)  
 
Q34) “The Task Force recommends to the Government that: Participatory forest management 
should be fast‐tracked to enhance the livelihoods of the communities. In particular, Community 
Forest Associations should be supported to actively participate in forest management;” 
(Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 69) 
 
 The degradation of the forest complex is framed as a threat to forest dependent communities: 
Q35) “Over the last decades, there has been extensive degradation of the Mau Forests 
Complex as a result of encroachment, excisions and illegal forest resources extraction. This 
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degradation is a major threat to water resources, biodiversity and livelihoods of forest 
dependent communities.” (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 9) 
 
However communities are also portrayed as the guilty party when it comes to forest 
degradation: 
Q36) “Degradation of the Mau Forests Complex has been associated with activities of 
communities residing in and around the Mau Forests Complex through activities such as 
firewood collection, overstocking livestock, encroachment, illegal logging for timber and 
charcoal production;” (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 15) 
 
7.3 Property rights, ownership and commodification of forest 
resources 
Land ownership presents a big problem for the conservation, afforestation, and reforestation of 
the Mau Forest Complex. As discussed in the case, the forest has been used as a patronage tool 
by powerful political actors in Kenya. This is also reflected upon on in the Report: 
Q37) The key findings of the audit of land ownership in the Mau Forests Complex include:  
a) The purpose of the 2001 excisions in the Mau Forests Complex was to resettle the Ogiek 
and the victims of 1990s land clashes. The Task Force established that beneficiaries 
included non deserving people, such as Government officials, political leaders and 
companies and that some of the allocation of land was carried out by unauthorized 
persons;  
b) It was established that most of the title deeds were issued prior to the degazettement of 
the forestland or after a High Court order restraining the Government and its officials 
and agents from alienating the whole or any portions of the forestland as proposed in 
the 2001 excisions Legal Notices; (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 12) 
To deal with this, the Task Force recommends that:  
 
Q38)  
a) “All title deeds that were either issued irregularly, or not issued in line with 
the stated purposes of the settlement schemes, or issued in critical water 
catchments and/or biodiversity hotspots, should be revoked. However, 
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irregular title deeds issued to bona-fide settlers, in line with the stated 
purposes of the settlement schemes, should be regularized;  
b) Ogiek who were to be settled in the excised areas and have not yet been given 
land and bona-fide settlers who were issued title deeds in critical water 
catchments or biodiversity hotspots should be settled outside the critical 
catchments and biodiversity hotspots;  
c) In the Maasai Mau trust land forest, all title deeds for land parcels 
encroaching into the Maasai Mau trust Land forest should also be revoked. In 
Ol Pusimoru, all critical water catchments and biodiversity hotspots should be 
repossessed;  
d) Third party purchasers for value should be compensated where appropriate;  
e) Land for public facilities should only be acquired through compulsory 
acquisition;  
f) Encroachers should be removed from the forests immediately; and,  
g) All non-deserving persons and other entities who benefited from illegal 
and/or irregular allocations of land in the Mau Forests Complex should be 
given an opportunity to surrender their land within a period of three months 
after the adoption of the report of the Task Force without sanctions. (Republic 
of Kenya, 2009, p. 13) 
Within the framework of REDD and environmental sustainability, and having in mind the 
ecological and economic importance of the Mau Forest, all these actions are understandable. 
This is further emphasised by the fact that the previously degazetted and appropriated land 
served the purpose and benefit of politically powerful people through the means of corruption. 
To be able to conserve and restore the forest, these actions are necessary. However, without 
proper legal treatment, and with the added danger of a earlier corrupt forest department (KFS) 
that is still in a transition period, these measures can easily be used as excuses for reclaiming 
larger areas than necessary. The measures can also be used to question ownership and thus 
leaving people without the right of proper reimbursement for lost land.  
 
 77 
I argue, that in light of the findings presented in the case, that these measures have become 
tools of appropriation by dispossession. As presented in the case, human rights violations are 
taking place in the forest, and people are losing their land, homes, and livelihoods as the KFS 
is evicting people from the forest.  
 
7.4 Benefit-sharing and resource access 
Benefit/s are mentioned 14 times in the Report, while access is mentioned once. According to 
the Task Force recommendations benefits should be an asset to forest communities and that 
livelihoods should be enhanced: 
Q39) 
a) Participatory forest management should be fast‐tracked to enhance the livelihoods of 
forest adjacent communities. They should be involved in afforestation and 
reforestation, among others;  
b) Value addition to forest products should be promoted;  
c) On farm forestry should be encouraged to reduce forest degradation and dependence 
on forest products; and,  
d) Benefits arising from payment for environmental services should also accrue to the 
adjacent communities involved in forest conservation. (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 15)   
 
Further the recommendations states: 
Q40) 
h) The cost of conserving and managing the Mau Forests Complex is borne by few 
mandated institutions. However, the goods and services derived from the conservation 
of the Mau Forests Complex benefit many stakeholders, including Government 
institutions, private sectors and communities;  (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 69) 
  
In a wider context the recommendations explain that: 
Q41) The Mau Forests Complex supports the livelihoods of millions of people in the Rift Valley 
and western Kenya. In the tea sector alone, approx. 35,000 jobs and the livelihoods of 50,000 
small farmers, supporting both together some 430,000 dependants, benefit from the ecological 
services provided by the Mau Forests Complex.  (Republic of Kenya, 2009, p. 17) 
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Reading these document extractions, it is clear that the intentions of the conservation process 
is to provide benefits for communities through both livelihood improvements and in form of 
payments for environmental services. At the same time the Report does not commit to this, 
rather, it recommends that it should accrue (Q39), Further, demonstrated by Q40), benefits are 
distributed amongst a range of stakeholders. This is not inherently negative, but it could open 
up for inequal distribution. Because of this, I argue that there a framework, preferably legal, 
should have been included to make sure benefits are shared. Under the conditioned presented 
here there are no guarantees this will happen. 
 
At the end, I would like to point out that there was no mention of resource access or forest 




8. Accumulation by dispossession, benefit-sharing and 
reports from the ground 
Through the information provided in the case, in the findings and through the discussion, I 
argue that the REDD readiness process in Kenya does facilitate a process of accumulation by 
dispossession. In relation to the REDD readiness documents, R-PIN and R-PP, I found that the 
policy does not directly facilitate this process, but that there are openings in the readiness policy 
for this process to take place. When this is put together with the Mau case and the findings and 
discussion related to the conservation recommendations it becomes evident that in the Kenyan 
context, with the belonging historical factors, these openings are enough for accumulation by 
dispossession to take place. 
 
The REDD readiness process does aim to include forest dependent people, it states that benefits 
should be distributed, however there is no legal frameworks to establish how this would work 
of specifically for whom. This means that there is an opening for benefits like payment for 
ecosystem services, carbon credit revenues, and funding to be unfairly distributed to other 
actors like the KFS or local authorities. Concluding that policy recommendations is tending 
towards empowering state actors and restricting indigenous people and forest dependent 
communities.  
 
There has previously been a wave of accumulation by dispossession in the Mau Forest 
Complex under president Moi with the settlement schemes, but the policy recommendations 
and implementation of these shows us that this is happening again. The reallocation of land, 
which is recommended in the Report, has opened up for appropriation of land and this has been 
misused.  
 
The research question asks how the REDD readiness process in Kenya facilitates a process of 
accumulation by dispossession opposed to benefit-sharing. The findings that were discussed in 
this thesis showed that benefit sharing amongst stakeholders was included. However, the 
language used was vague and uncommitting. Moreover, there was no clear framework for how 
benefits would be fairly shared. Neither was there a clear effort to create guidelines that could 
contribute to fair benefit-sharing. The outcome of this is uncertain, nevertheless, I argue that 
the lack of any framework, legal or otherwise, does provide an opening for uneven benefit 
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sharing. This also applies for livelihood enhancement and resource access. With this in mind 
it is important to point out that the REDD readiness documents, and the Mau Forest 
Conservation recommendation does not directly facilitate a process where powerful actors gain 
control over assets and resources by restricting and evicting previous users. With a stronger 
legal framework that confirms indigenous rights and communities’ access to forest resources, 
processes of accumulation by dispossession might be avoided.  
 
In relation to carbon removal strategies and negative emissions technology, I argue that there 
are lessons to be learned from this study. First, that commodification of forest through REDD+ 
stands in danger of increasing inequality by removing resource access, control and ownership 
from communities to more powerful actors. This does not serve the + side of the REDD 
mechanism. Second, that REDD+ implementation in countries with histories of land 
appropriation, corruption, and weak institutions can lead to conflicts between authorities and 
local communities where people end up with the shorter end of the stick. The consequence of 
this does sit easy with principles of sustainable development and poverty elevation. 
 
Third, with regard to the vast landmasses needed to offset emissions in the fourth IPCC ( 2018) 
pathway, I argue that we need to take another look at the feasibility of such projects. The REDD 
readiness process in Kenya was estimated to take five years (KFS, 2010b), but the REDD 
readiness package is still nowhere in sight. The same goes for the Mau Forest Complex 
restoration efforts. Initiated in 2008, the process is still in the phase of reallocating land and 
evicting people from the forest. The exposures of human rights violations has led the European 
Union has suspended its support for the conservation project (EU, 2018). This put the 
feasibility of converting landscapes on vast scales into question. 
 
This brings us to the recommendations for further investigations. First of all, further 
investigation on the feasibility of carbon removal strategies and offset mechanism with 
reference to an implementation timeframe is needed in the negative emissions technology 
debate. It would be a shame if the measures to halt climate change becomes based on unrealistic 
projects that are not achievable by the time we need them. I also think that a similar study, with 
the inclusion of poststructural and actor-oriented power perspectives could further inform how 
accumulation by dispossession is facilitated through carbon removal projects. There is also 
room for field studies and observations to be included. I think this would contribute to further 
understanding such projects in the time of sustainable development and climate change.  
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